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Abstract  
 
In Advances in Pure Mathematics (www.scirp.org/journal/apm), Vol. 1, No. 4 (July 2011), pp. 
136-154, the mathematical structure of the much discussed problem of probability known as 
the Monty Hall problem was mapped in detail. It is styled here as Monty Hall 1.0. The 
proposed analysis was then generalized to related cases involving any number of doors (d), 
cars (c), and opened doors (o) (Monty Hall 2.0) and 1 specific case involving more than 1 
picked door (p) (Monty Hall 3.0). In cognitive terms, this analysis was interpreted in function 
of the presumed digital nature of rational thought and language.  
 In the present paper, Monty Hall 1.0 and 2.0 are briefly reviewed (§§2-3). Additional 
generalizations of the problem are then presented in §§4-7. They concern expansions of the 
problem to the following items: (1) to any number of picked doors, with p denoting the 
number of doors initially picked and q the number of doors picked when switching doors after 
doors have been opened to reveal goats (Monty Hall 3.0; see §4); (3) to the precise conditions 
under which one’s chances increase or decrease in instances of Monty Hall 3.0 (Monty Hall 
3.2; see §6); and (4) to any number of switches of doors (s) (Monty Hall 4.0; see §7). The 
afore-mentioned article in APM, Vol. 1, No. 4 may serve as a useful introduction to the 
analysis of the higher variations of the Monty Hall problem offered in the present article. 
 An appendix by Richard D. Gill (see §8) provides additional context by building a bridge 
to modern probability theory in its conventional notation and by pointing to the benefits of 
certain interesting and relevant tools of computation now available on the Internet.  
 The cognitive component of the earlier investigation is extended in §9 by reflections on 
the foundations of mathematics. It will be proposed, in the footsteps of George Boole, that the 
phenomenon of mathematics needs to be defined in empirical terms as something that happens 
to the brain or something that the brain does. It is generally assumed that mathematics is a 
property of nature or reality or whatever one may call it. There is not the slightest intention in 
this paper to falsify this assumption because it cannot be falsified, just as it cannot be 
empirically or positively proven. But there is no way that this assumption can be a factual 
observation. It can be no more than an altogether reasonable, yet fully secondary, inference 
derived mainly from the fact that mathematics appears to work, even if some may deem the 
fact of this match to constitute proof. On the deepest empirical level, mathematics can only be 
directly observed and therefore directly analyzed as an activity of the brain. The study of 
mathematics therefore becomes an essential part of the study of cognition and human 
intelligence. The reflections on mathematics as a phenomenon offered in the present article 
will serve as a prelude to planned articles on how to redefine the foundations of probability as 
one type of mathematics in cognitive fashion and on how exactly Boole’s theory of probability 
subsumes, supersedes, and completes classical probability theory.  
 §§2-7 combined, on the one hand, and §9, on the other hand, are both self-sufficient units 
and can be read independently from one another.  
 The ultimate design of the larger project of which this paper is part remains the increase of 
digitalization of the analysis of rational thought and language, that is, of (rational, not 
emotional) human intelligence. To reach out to other disciplines, an effort is made to describe 
the mathematics more explicitly than is usual.  
 
Keywords: Artificial Intelligence, Binary Structure, Boolean Algebra, Boolean Operators, 
Boole’s Algebra, Brain Science, Cognition, Cognitive Science, Definition of 
Mathematics, Definition of Probability Theory, Digital Mathematics, Electrical 
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Monty Hall Problem, Neuroscience, Non-quantitative and Quantitative 
Mathematics, Probability Theory, Rational Thought and Language  
 
1. Introduction  
 
In Advances in Pure Mathematics, 2011, Vol. 1, No. 4, pp. 136-154, the mathematical 
structure of the well-known problem of probability known as the Monty Hall problem (see §2 
below) was mapped in detail [1]. This mathematical structure includes two components that 
complement one another seamlessly. One component is digital or non-quantitative. The other 
is quantitative. The focus of that earlier paper was mainly on the neglected digital component. 
The digital component was analyzed in the spirit and the algebra of George Boole’s 
Investigation of the Laws of Thought (1854), the Magna Charta of the digital age. Much of 
what has been said in the earlier paper is presupposed in what follows.  
 In said article, the analysis of the Monty Hall problem was extended in two directions. 
First, on the cognitive side, the digital analysis was interpreted as an organic reflection of the 
presumed digital nature of human cognition as expressed by rational thought and language and 
as evidenced empirically by facts of language. Probing the nature of rational thought and 
language was in a sense the ulterior motive of analyzing the Monty Hall problem. Second, on 
the mathematical side, the Monty Hall problem was generalized to related cases in accordance 
with the axioms of probability theory (Monty Hall 2.0). The aim was to demonstrate the 
reliability and productivity of the proposed digital approach. This first generalization is briefly 
reviewed in §3 below.  
 The analysis of the Monty Hall problem is extended again, both mathematically and 
cognitively, in the present paper. First, in mathematical terms, the validity of the proposed 
digital approach is bolstered by additional generalizations of the Monty Hall problem in ’ 4,  
§5, §6, and §7 (Monty Hall 3.0 and 4.0). This process could presumably be carried on ad 
infinitum, at some point entering the domain of calculus. 
 Second, in cognitive terms, an attempt is made to render the presumed deep organic link 
between the digital component of probability theory and the digital nature of rational thought 
and language more probable by defining what mathematics is (see §8 below). In terms of the 
search for the deepest foundations of mathematics, it is proposed that mathematics is best 
defined first and foremost as something that the brain does as it engages reality outside itself 
through the senses.  
 §§2-7 combined, on the one hand, and §9, on the other hand, are self-sufficient and can be 
read independently from one another. In other words, it is not necessary to read §§2-7 in order 
to read §9.  
 An appendix by Richard D. Gill (see §8) provides additional context by building a bridge 
to modern probability theory in its conventional notation and by pointing to the benefits of 
certain interesting and relevant tools of computation now available on the Internet.  
 It is hoped that the reflections presented in §9 on the nature and definition of mathematics 
will serve as a prelude  to forthcoming papers on the foundations of probability theory as one 
type of mathematics entitled “How Boole’s Theory of Probability Subsumes, Supersedes, and 
Completes Classical Probability Theory: A Digital, Quantitative, and Cognitive Analysis,” in 
which an attempt will be made to describe how exactly Boole’s theory of probability, which 
has been almost entirely neglected for one and a half centuries, makes the classical theory of 
probability complete. It is imperative that a mathematical theory consider all possible cases. 
Classical probability theory does not.  
 H.H. Goldstine writes about Boole that “our debt to this simple, quiet man . . . is 
extraordinarily great and probably not adequately repaid” [2]. Goldstine is referring to the 
enormous significance of Boole’s digital mathematics in modern computer science. It is 
suggested in §8 that the extent of the debt may far exceed computer science and reach deeply 
into the analysis of rational thought and language or human intelligence.  
 
2. Monty Hall 1.0: The Original Monty Hall Problem, Featuring 1 Car (c), 3 Doors (d), 1 
Opened Door (o), 1 Door Initially Picked (p), and 1 Door Picked by Switching (q) 
 
Behind 3 closed doors, 2 goats and 1 car are hiding. One picks 1 door with the aim of getting 
the 1 car. The 1 door that one picks remains closed, however. Next, someone who knows what 
is hiding behind all the doors opens 1 of the 2 doors that were not picked, more specifically 1 
door hiding a goat. 2 doors remain closed and available for picking, including the one initially 
picked. The Monty Hall problem involves the following question: Should one switch from the 
unopened door that one initially picked to the other door that remains unopened to improve 
one’s chances of getting the car? The answer is: One should, because one doubles one’s 
chances of getting the car—namely from 1 in 3 to 2 in 3—by switching doors once 1 door has 
been opened to reveal 1 goat.  
 
3. Monty Hall 2.0: Generalization to Any Number of Doors (d), Cars (c), and Opened 
Doors (o)  
 
The present generalization is treated in detail in the article mentioned in §1 above. What 
follows is a brief summary of this treatment.  
 The Monty Hall problem involves 1 car (c), 2 goats (g), 3 doors (d), 1 opened door (o), 
and 1 picked door (p). There are 5 variables. But in extending and generalizing the Monty Hall 
problem, only 4 variables need to be considered. That is because, of the 3 variables c, g, and d, 
each can be derived from the two others. From the fact that  
   c g  = d,  
it follows that  
   c  = d g   and g  = d c . 
Only 2 of the variables c, g, and d therefore need to be considered. In what follows, c (cars) 
and d (doors) are chosen.  
  As a general rule, in Monty Hall 2.0, one always improves one’s chances of getting a car 
by switching doors when doors are opened to reveal goats. This will no longer be the case 
from Monty Hall 3.0 onward (see §4.12 and §6). The question remains: By how much? If the 
Monty Hall problem is generalized to any number of cars (c), doors (d), and opened doors (o), 
and only 1 door is picked, the chance of getting the car (C) by switching (s) doors (Cs) is  
   c d
d d o
( )
( )

 
1
1
  (1),   
and the factor by which one improves one’s chances of getting the car by switching is 
   d
d o

 
1
1
  (2).  
The number 1 in these expressions represents the number of picked doors (p), which is fixed at 
1.  
 For example, let there be 123,456,789 (or more than 123 million) doors (d), of which 
12,345,678 (or more than 12.3 million) hide cars (c). Also assume that 1,234,567 (or more 
than 1.23 million) doors are opened (o) to reveal goats. The chances of getting a car (C) by 
switching (s) doors (Cs) is, according to expression (1),  
   12 345 678 123 456 789 1
123 456 789 123 456 789 1 1 234 567
, , ( , , )
, , ( , , , , )

   = about 0.101 or 10.1%.  
The factor by which one increases one’s chances of getting a car by switching doors is, 
according to expression (2),  
   123 456 789 1
123 456 789 1 1 234 567
, ,
, , , ,

   = about 1.010.  
If this factor were 1, one would not increase one’s chances because multiplying any number 
by 1 does not increase that number. But because the factor is about 1.010, one increases one’s 
chances by about by about 0.01 or about 1%.  
 One’s chances of getting a car when initially picking 1 door is the fraction of which the 
number of cars (c) is the numerator and the number of doors (d) the denominator, namely c/d, 
which in this case is  
   12 345 678
123 456 789
, ,
, ,
 = about 0.0999999927 or just about 10%.  
Increasing one’s chances from about 10% to about 10.1% indeed involves an increase of 1%, 
since 1% of 10 is about 0.1.  
 Since there are 123,456,789 doors (d) and 12,345,678 cars (c), there are 111,111,111 goats 
(g). According to the rules of the extended Monty Hall problem, up to g 1 doors can be 
opened to reveal goats, that is, 111,111,110 doors can be opened (o). If one opens the 
maximum number of doors that one is allowed to open, then according to expression (2) one 
increases one’s chances of getting a car by switching by a factor of  
   123 456 789 1
123 456 789 1 111111110
, ,
, , , ,

   = 12,345,678.  
Since a factor of 1 corresponds to a 0% increase, a factor of 2 to a 100% increase, a factor of 3 
to 200% increase, and so on, a factor of 12,345,678 corresponds to an increase of 
1,234,567,700%. In other words, one improves one’s chances of getting a car by more than 
1.23 billion percent by switching. 
 As regards the basic treatment of the Monty Hall problem in the afore-mentioned article, 
an additional note on notation is in order. Boole never ceased to impress upon his readers that 
probability is a field of mathematics that straddles the digital-mathematical and the 
quantitative-mathematical. The digital-mathematical and the quantitative-mathematical coexist 
in the single phenomenon of probability. To use a metaphor, it is a bit like Christianity’s 
Trinity, three divine entities coexisting as one, although in this case not a trinity but a Duality 
is concerned. In probability as a field of mathematics, the digital-mathematical and the 
quantitative-mathematical are two facets of what is ultimately a single thing. Naturally, the 
human brain cannot quite think about the two facets at the very same time. But that is just a 
limitation of our mental capacities.  
 In Boole’s notation, this coexistence of two facets in a single phenomenon is evoked 
felicitously by the single symbol u  admitting of two interpretations. Consider the following 
two equivalent expressions found in the afore-mentioned article [3]:  
Ci u  C s : cd
g o
d o
u  1
.  
Both expressions describe the probability of initially picking a car and then picking a goat or 
non-car by switching.  
 The expression to the left of the colon is digital-mathematical. In this expression, the 
quantitative aspect is irrelevant. Accordingly, the symbols Ci and C s are not quantitative. 
Likewise, if one divides the universe in strictly digital terms into four digital combination 
classes involving the two classes “black” (b) and “cat” (c), then the universe (1) equals bc + b c 
+ bc  + b  c , that is, black cats, non-black cats, black things that are not cats, and things that are 
neither black nor cats. The sets bc “black cats” and b c “non-black cats” will in all probability 
differ in quantity, assuming that it is possible to count all black and non-black cats. However, 
the difference in quantity is irrelevant in the digital-mathematical expression of the universe.  
 The expression to the right of the colon is quantitative-mathematical. Indeed, the symbols 
c, g, d, and o are quantitative. They stand for numbers of cars, goats, doors, and opened doors. 
It follows that the symbol u  admits of both a digital and a quantitative interpretation. The two 
interpretations may denoted by ud  and uq . Accordingly, the following equation applies: 
Ci  ud   C s  (digital) = 
c
d
 uq  
g o
d o

 1
  (quantitative).  
 Multiplication is commutative. That means that a bu  = b au . However, it may be 
tempting to assume that ud  is not commutative. It is a fact that the event C s, not getting a car 
by switching doors, follows the event Ci, initially getting a car, in time. And yet, in 
contemplating the combination of Ci and C s, nothing prevents one from contemplating C s  
first. The order in which one contemplates the two does not matter mathematically, even if it 
may come more naturally to think first of what comes first in time. Likewise, on the 
quantitative-mathematical level, the following equation applies:  
   c
d
 uq  
g o
d o

 1
 = g o
d o

 1
 uq
c
d
.  
 
4. Monty Hall 3.0: Additional Generalization to Any Number of Doors Picked Initially 
(p) or of Doors Picked by Switching (q)  
 
4.1. The Special Case of Getting at Least 1 Car when Switching Doors  
 
In Monty Hall 1.0 and 2.0, just 1 door is picked both before and after switching. The most 
natural expansion of 1.0 and 2.0 would seem to be the generalization in which any number of 
doors are picked both before and after switching. The number of doors picked will be denoted 
by p; the number of doors picked by switching, by q. The present generalization is styled here 
as Monty Hall 3.0. 
 One can imagine many desired outcomes of picking 1 or more doors. For example, the 
desired outcome might be to get cars with every door pick both before and after switching. Or 
the desired outcome might be to obtain 1 car in the 1st and the 3rd of 3 initial picks as 
compared to picking 1 car in the 1st of 2 picks by switching. And so on. Treating all desired 
outcomes comprehensively exceeds the scope of the present paper. In such a comprehensive 
treatment, it is necessary to take one’s departure from the equation representing the total 
probability of all possible outcomes, whose individual probabilities add up to 1 or 100%. It is 
hoped that it will be possible to present a survey of the respective probabilities of all possible 
outcomes in a future paper.  
 Presently, just 1 desired outcome will be selected. The aim is to select an outcome that 
concords with the spirit of the original Monty Hall problem. In the original problem, the 
person picking a door wants a car. Accordingly, when more than 1 door is picked, the desired 
outcome that most closely reflects the spirit of the original Monty Hall problem is getting at 
least 1 car. It would be awkward to deny the person any car at all if more than 1 car are 
picked.  
  The probability P that one will get at least 1 car by switching doors is a fraction whose 
numerator is N and whose denominator is D. N and D are defined below. Most the rest of §4 is 
devoted to a description of how the equation below is obtained. A more explicit version of the 
numerator appears in §4.17 below.  
 The precise relation between the following expression and the common probabilistic 
conceptualization known as hypergeometric distribution will be described in a future paper. 
 
P = 
N
D
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In the following maximally compacted version of the numerator, the coefficient terms have 
been reduced from 5 to 4 and much of the transparency has been lost.  
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4.2. Point of Departure: An Example  
 
It will be convenient to begin the description of how the Equation in §4.1 is obtained with a 
specific example. Once it is seen how the probability of getting at least 1 car by switching 
doors after doors hiding goats have been opened is obtained in1case, the result can be 
generalized to all cases. In the example that will be used here, the numbers of the variables are 
as follows:  
 
   cars (c)    =   5;  
   goats (g)    =   7;  
   doors (d = c g  )   = 12;  
  doors picked initially (p)  =   3;  
doors subsequently opened (o) =   2; 
doors picked by switching (q) =   2.  
 
4.3. All Possible Scenarios as Sequences of 5 Picks of Doors Hiding Cars or Goats  
 
It lies in the nature of probability that a number of different scenarios can be expected, each 
with its own degree of probability. In the example at hand, all possible scenarios consist of 5 
successive picks of doors that hide either cars or goats. There are 3 initial picks of doors (p = 
3) and 2 additional picks of doors by switching doors (q = 2) after 2 doors revealing goats 
have been opened (o = 2).   
 
4.4. The 32 Possible Sequences of Picks  
 
To be determined first are all the possible sequences of 5 picks in which either cars (c) or 
goats (g) are picked. There are 32 possible sequences, as follows: (1) ccccc (picking a car at 
every pick); (2) ccccg  (picking 4 cars and then 1 goat); (3) cccgc (picking 3 cars, then  1 goat, 
and finally 1 car); (4) cccgg; (5) ccgcc; (6) ccgcg; (7) ccggc; (8) ccggg; (9) cgccc; (10) cgccg; 
(11) cgcgc; (12) cgcgg; (13) gcccc; (14) gcccg; (15) gccgc; (16) gccgg; (17) cggcc; (18) 
cggcg; (19) cgggc; (20) cgggg; (21) gcgcc; (22) gcgcg; (23) gcggc; (24) gcggg; (25) ggccc; 
(26) ggccg; (27) ggcgc; (28) ggcgg; (29) gggcc; (30) gggcg; (31) ggggc; and (32) ggggg.  
 More generally speaking, the number 32 is obtained as follows according to the theory of 
permutations. At 1st pick, there are only 2 possible scenarios: one picks either a car or a goat. 
In the 1st and 2nd picks combined, there are 4 possible scenarios: after picking a car in the 1st 
pick, one can pick either a car or a goat in the 2nd pick; likewise, after picking a goat in the 1st 
pick, one can pick either a car or goat in the 2nd pick. In other words, the number of possible 
scenarios has doubled from the 1st pick to the 2nd pick from 2 or 21 to 4 or 22. It is easily seen 
that the number of possible scenarios will likewise double at every successive pick. 
Accordingly, the number of possible scenarios after 5 picks will be 25 or 32.  
 
4.5. The Changing Probabilities of Each Successive Pick  
 
The probability of each single pick is a fraction whose numerator is either the number of 
available cars or the number of available goats and whose denominator is the number of 
available doors. At 1st pick, all the cars, goats, and doors are still available for picking. 
Accordingly, in the example at hand, the chance of picking a car is c/d, that is, 5/12, and the 
chance of picking a goat is g/d, that is, 7/12.  
 After each pick, the denominator or the number of doors decreases by 1, from d  to d 1, 
and so on. The number of available doors decreases additionally when doors are opened to 
reveal goats. In the example at hand, the number of available doors first decreases from 12 to 
9 as 3 doors are picked. The number then further decreases to 7 when 2 doors are opened to 
reveal goats. Finally, the number decreases to 5 as 2 more doors are picked by switching 
doors. 
 The number of available cars does not decrease when a goat is picked. Nor does the 
number of available goats when a car is picked. By contrast, the number of doors decreases at 
every pick. It follows that the probability of picking a car or a goat changes at every successive 
pick because at least the number of available doors, which constitutes the denominator of the 
probability of each pick, changes.  
 
4.6. Conditional Probability as a Property of All Picks Preceded by Other Picks  
 
Each pick decreases the number of the available doors as well as either the number of 
available cars or the number of available goats. In that regard, each pick of either a car or a 
goat changes the probability of later picks of either a car or a goat. In other words, the 
probability of a later pick of either a goat or a car is dependent on what happens in an earlier 
pick or earlier picks. An event whose probability is affected by what happens in earlier events 
is called a dependent event.  Events on which other events are dependent may be called lead 
events. In the Monty Hall problem and its extensions, only the very 1st car picks and the 1st 
goat picks of sequences of picks are not dependent. An event is usually called dependent in the 
context of the combined probability of 2 or more events in which some events are dependent 
and others are not. Thus, the combined probability of picking two cars in a row is c/d 
u ( )c 1 / ( )d 1 . The 1st pick is the lead pick. The 2nd pick is the dependent pick. 
 Earlier picks serve as conditions of the probability of later picks. Accordingly, the general 
phenomenon in which the probability of a later event is changed by an earlier event from what 
its probability would have been without that earlier event taking place is called conditional 
probability. 
 For example, the probability of picking a car when all cars and all doors are still available 
is c/d. But once 1 car is picked, the number of cars and doors both decrease by 1, the 
assumption being that one cannot pick the same door twice. The probability of picking a car 
therefore changes to ( )c 1 / ( )d 1 . When a goat is picked instead of a car, the probability of 
picking a car changes instead to c/ ( )d 1 . At the same time, the probability of picking a goat 
changes to ( )g 1 / ( )d 1 .  
 An event is usually called dependent in the context of the combined probability of two or 
more events in which some events are dependent and others are not. Thus, the combined 
probability of picking two cars in a row is c/d u ( )c 1 / ( )d 1 . The 1st pick is the lead pick. 
The 2nd pick is the dependent pick. 
 The degree to which a prior event changes the probability of an event from what it would 
have been without that prior event can be quantified. In the example at hand, the change in 
probability from c/d to ( )c 1 /( )d 1  that results from the pick of a car corresponds to a 
diminution in probability of 7/132, or about 5.3%, from 5/12 to 4/11. By contrast, the change 
from c/d to c/ ( )d 1  that results from the pick of a goat corresponds to an increase in 
probability of 5/132, or about 3.8%, from 5/12 to 5/11. In sum, conditional probability is best 
measured or quantified as the degree of change between a 1st event and a 2nd event whose 
probability depends on the 1st event.  
 
4.7. The General Denominator of the Equation in §4.1  
 
It has been noted in §4.4 that there are 32 possible sequences of 5 picks in the example at 
hand. Each sequence of 5 picks comes with its own probability. The specific denominator of 
all 32 probabilities is the same, namely d d d( )( ) 1 2 u ( )( )d o d o   3 4 , or in the 
example at hand, 12 12 1 12 2( )( )  u ( )( )12 2 3 12 2 4    , or 12 11 10 7 6u u u u . In other 
words, 12 11 10 7 6u u u u  is the common denominator of all 32 probabilities. The sign 
u separates the picks of doors before doors are opened from the picks of doors after doors are 
opened.  
 What is the general form of the denominator? It appears that the expression 12 11 10u u  is 
the 1st portion of 12!, or of 12 factorial, or also of 12u 11 u 10 u 9 u 8 u 7 u 6 u 5 u 4 u 3 u 2 u 1, 
and that 7 6u  is the 1st portion of 7!, or of 7 factorial, or also of 7 u 6 u 5 u 4 u 3 u 2 u 1. In fact, 
the two components of the denominator will always be portions of factorials. The need 
therefore arises to represent the two components of the denominator in general forms as 
portions of factorials.  
 In that regard, 12 11 10u u  is nothing but 12! divided by 9!, or 12u 11 u 10 u 9 u 8 u  
7 u 6 u 5 u 4 u 3 u 2 u 1 divided by 9 u 8 u 7 u 6 u 5 u 4 u 3 u 2 u 1. The elimination of the common 
factor 9u 8 u 7 u 6 u 5 u 4 u 3 u 2 u 1 yields the desired 12 u 11 u 10. Likewise, 7 6u  is the same 
as 7! divided by 5!, or 7u 6 u 5 u 4 u 3 u 2 u 1 divided by 5 u 4 u 3 u 2 u 1. The elimination of the 
common factor 5u 4 u 3 u 2 u 1 yields the desired 7 u 6.  
 In converting 12!/9! into a general form, it appears that 12 is the number of doors (d) and 9 
is the number of the doors (d) minus the number of doors picked before doors are opened (p), 
that is, d p . Consequently, the general equivalent of specific 12!/9! is d!/( d p )!. In 
converting 7!/5! into a general form, it appears that 7 is the number of doors picked before 
doors are opened (p) minus the number of opened doors (o), that is, d p o  , and that 5 is 
the number of doors picked before doors are opened (p) minus the number of opened doors (o) 
minus the number of doors picked after doors are opened, that is, d p o q   . 
Consequently, the general equivalent of specific 7!/5! is ( d p o  )!/( d p o q   )!.  
 It may be concluded that the general form of the denominator of the fraction that expresses 
the probability that1will get at least 1 car by switching doors for any number of d, c, g, p, o, or 
q is as follows:  
 d
d p
d p o
d p o q
!
( )!
( )!
( )! u
 
   .  
 
4.8. The Specific Numerators of the Probabilities of the 32 Sequences of Picks in the 
Example at Hand  
 
It has been noted in §4.4 that there are 32 possible sequences of 5 picks in the example at 
hand. Each sequence of 5 picks comes with its own probability. Each of these 5 probabilities 
is expressed by its own fraction and each fraction has its own numerator. The numerators of 
the 5 individual probabilities of all the 32 scenarios are as follows, withu again separating the 
picks of doors before doors are opened from the picks of doors after doors are opened.  
 
1.   cccu cc:  c c c c c( )( ) ( )( )  u  1 2 3 4  
2.   cccu cg:  c c c c g o( )( ) ( )( )  u  1 2 3  
3.   cccu gc:  c c c g o c( )( ) ( )( )  u  1 2 3  
4.   cccu gg:  c c c g o g o( )( ) ( )( )  u   1 2 1  
5.   ccgu cc:  c c g c c( ) ( )( ) u  1 2 3  
6.   ccgu cg:  c c g c g o( ) ( )( ) u   1 2 1  
7.   ccgu gc:  c c g g o c( ) ( )( ) u   1 1 2  
8.   ccgu gg:  c c g g o g o( ) ( )( ) u    1 1 2  
9.   cgc u cc:  cg c c c( ) ( )( ) u  1 2 3  
10. cgcu cg:  cg c c g o( ) ( )( ) u   1 2 1  
11. cgc u gc:  cg c g o c( ) ( )( ) u   1 1 2  
12. cgc u gg:  cg c g o g o( ) ( )( ) u    1 1 2  
13. gccu cc:  gc c c c( ) ( )( ) u  1 2 3  
14. gccu cg:  gc c c g o( ) ( )( ) u   1 2 1  
15. gccu gc:  gc c g o c( ) ( )( ) u   1 1 2  
16. gccu gg:  gc c g o g o( ) ( )( ) u    1 1 2  
17. cggu cc:  cg g c c( ) ( )( ) u  1 1 2  
18. cggu cg:  cg g c g o( ) ( )( ) u   1 1 2  
19. cggu gc:  cg g g o c( ) ( )( ) u   1 2 1  
20. cggu gg:  cg g g o g o( ) ( )( ) u    1 2 3  
21. gcgu cc:  gc g c c( ) ( )( ) u  1 1 2  
22. gcgu cg:  gc g c g o( ) ( )( ) u   1 1 2  
23. gcgu gc:  gc g g o c( ) ( )( ) u   1 2 1  
24. gcgu gg:  gc g g o g o( ) ( )( ) u    1 2 3  
25. ggcu cc:  g g c c c( ) ( )( ) u  1 1 2  
26. ggcu cg:  g g c c g o( ) ( )( ) u   1 1 2  
27. ggcu gc:  g g c g o c( ) ( )( ) u   1 2 1  
28. ggcu gg:  g g c g o g o( ) ( )( ) u    1 2 3  
29. gggu cc:  g g g c c( )( ) ( )  u 1 2 1  
30. gggu cg:  g g g c g o( )( ) ( )  u  1 2 3   
31. gggu gc:  g g g g o c( )( ) ( )  u  1 2 3   
32. gggu gg:  g g g g o g o( )( ) ( )( )  u    1 2 3 4  
 
I refrain from detailing how each single factor in the products is obtained. The principles of 
conditional probability have been explicated above. Suffice it to note that the number of the 
cars available for picking decreases by 1 every time a car gets picked. And so does the number 
of the goats. In addition, the number of the goats decreases by the number of opened doors. 
 It is not the case that the 32 sequences of picks are all equally probable. For example, 
picking 5 cars in a row (no. 1) is naturally less probable than picking 5 goats in a row (no. 32) 
because there are fewer cars to pick.  
 
4.9. The Specific Numerators of the Probabilities of the 24 Sequences of Picks that Yield 
at least 1 Car in the Example at Hand  
 
In order to obtain the numerator of the probability that1will get at least 1 car by switching 
doors, only those sequences of picks in which either or both of the 2 picks made after doors 
have been opened yield at least 1 car can be considered. Or, the 8 sequences that yield no car 
need to be eliminated. They are sequences 4, 8, 12, 16, 20, 24, 28, and 32. In the list below, 
the 8 sequences in question have been removed. What is more, the sequences have been 
reordered and so have the factors within the sequences to assimilate like to like. Reordering 
the factors is obviously possible because multiplication is commutative. But no factors have 
been moved across the symbolu because the factors at both sides ofu belong to different picks 
as events. Also, the order of c and g has not been changed in the expressions of the type 
ccc u cc. The result of this reordering is the following 8 groups of sequences, numbered i-viii. 
 
Group i 
 1.    cccu cc:  c c c c c( )( ) ( )( )  u  1 2 3 4  
Group ii 
 2.    cccu cg:  c c c c g o( )( ) ( )( )  u  1 2 3  
 3.    cccu gc : c c c c g o( )( ) ( )( )  u  1 2 3  
Group iii 
 5.   ccgu cc:  c c g c c( ) ( )( ) u  1 2 3  
 9.   cgcu cc:  c c g c c( ) ( )( ) u  1 2 3  
 13. gccu cc:  c c g c c( ) ( )( ) u  1 2 3  
Group iv 
 6.   ccgu cg:  c c g c g o( ) ( )( ) u   1 2 1  
 7.   ccgu gc:  c c g c g o( ) ( )( ) u   1 2 1  
 10. cgcu cg:  c c g c g o( ) ( )( ) u   1 2 1  
 11. cgcu gc:  c c g c g o( ) ( )( ) u   1 2 1  
 14. gccu cg:  c c g c g o( ) ( )( ) u   1 2 1  
 15. gccu gc:  c c g c g o( ) ( )( ) u   1 2 1  
Group v 
 17. cggu cc:  cg g c c( ) ( )( ) u  1 1 2  
 21. gcgu cc:  cg g c c( ) ( )( ) u  1 1 2  
 25. ggcu cc:  cg g c c( ) ( )( ) u  1 1 2  
Group vi  
 18. cggu cg:  cg g c g o( ) ( )( ) u   1 1 2  
 19. cggu gc:  cg g c g o( ) ( )( ) u   1 1 2  
 22. gcgu cg:  cg g c g o( ) ( )( ) u   1 1 2  
 23. gcgu gc:  cg g c g o( ) ( )( ) u   1 1 2  
 26. ggcu cg:  cg g c g o( ) ( )( ) u   1 1 2  
 27. ggcu gc:  cg g c g o( ) ( )( ) u   1 1 2  
Group vii  
 29. gggu cc:  g g g c c( )( ) ( )  u 1 2 1  
Group viii 
 30. gggu cg:  g g g c g o( )( ) ( )  u  1 2 3  
 31. gggu gc:  g g g c g o( )( ) ( )  u  1 2 3  
 
The design of what follows is to construct the general expression for the probability that1will 
get the car by switching for any number of d, c, g, p, o, or q from the 24 products of 5 factors 
listed above. In doing so, I am deliberately more explicit than might otherwise be the case in a 
mathematics journal in order to be more accessible and inviting. The ulterior design of the 
present effort lies after all beyond mathematics. It is the description of the structure of human 
intelligence.  
 In turning the example at hand into a general expression, two operations need to be 
performed: (1) the addition of two sequences of coefficients, one relating to p and the other to 
q, and (2) the addition of factorials. Once these two operations have been performed, it can be 
determined whether any simplifications are possible. The addition of factorials has already 
been discussed above. For example, a product such as c c c( )( ) 1 2 , that is, 5 u 4 u 3 in the 
example at hand, can first be converted into c!/ ( )!c  3 , that is, 5!/ ( )!5 3  or 
5 u 4 u 3 u 2 u 1/2 u 1 in the example at hand. It can then be generalized to c!/ ( )!c p . It will 
therefore be useful to turn first to the coefficients, which involve “the most famous of all 
number patterns” [4].  
 
4.10. The Coefficients of the Probabilities of the 24 Sequences of Picks that Yield at least 
1 Car in the Example at Hand  
 
In the list of products in §4.9, in which like has been assimilated to like, there are 8 groups of 
sequences of picks consisting of 1, 2, 3, 6, 3, 6, 1, and 2 sequences respectively. How can 
these numbers be accounted for?  
 On closer inspection, it appears that they have everything to do with how many 
permutations of c and g there are in the 2 components before and after u .  
 For example, in the 2nd group consisting of nos. 2 and 3, the initial product is either 
ccc u cg or ccc u gc. Before u , there is 1 permutation, namely ccc. After u , there are 2 
permutations, namely cg and gc. Accordingly, there are 1u 2 or 2 members in the group.  
 In the 3rd group, there are 3 permutations before u , namely ccg, cgc, and gcc, and 2 
permutations after u , namely cg and gc. Accordingly, there are 3 u 2 or 6 members in the 
group.  
 Furthermore, the reason that there are 3 permutations before the symbol u  in the 3rd group 
is that there are 3 picks of doors (p) before doors are opened and each of the 3 picked doors, 
either the 1st, the 2nd, or the 3rd, can hide the 1 goat (g) that is picked in each of the 3 
sequences in question. Also, the reason that there are 2 permutations after the symbol u is that 
there are 2 picks after doors are opened and each of the 2 doors picked, either the 1st or the 
2nd, can hide the 1 pick of a goat (g) that is part of the sequences in question. The product 
3 u 2 is therefore nothing but p u q.  
 The members of the 8 groups of sequences listed in §4.7 all share the same sequence of 
picks once the factors have been reordered. In other words, there are only 8 different 
sequences among the 24 sequences listed in §4.7. They are as follows.  
 
Sequence i  
 c c c c c( )( ) ( )( )  u  1 2 3 4  
Sequence ii  
 c c c c g o( )( ) ( )( )  u  1 2 3  
  Sequence iii  
 c c g c c( ) ( )( ) u  1 2 3  
Sequence iv  
 c c g c g o( ) ( )( ) u   1 2 1  
Sequence v  
 cg g c c( ) ( )( ) u  1 1 2  
Sequence vi  
 cg g c g o( ) ( )( ) u   1 1 2  
Sequence vii  
 g g g c c( )( ) ( )  u 1 2 1  
Sequence viii 
 g g g c g o( )( ) ( )  u  1 2 3   
 
 The number of times that each of the 8 sequences is represented, namely 1, 2, 3, 6, 3, 6, 1, 
and 2 times respectively, may be called the coefficient of the 8 sequences. It has been noted 
above that the numbers of times in question are determined by both p and q. It appears, 
therefore, that each sequence is characterized by two coefficients,1derived from p and the 
other derived from q. It is the product of the two coefficients that constitutes the compound 
coefficient of each sequence. 
 The 8 compound coefficients in question can now be determined in terms of p and q by 
counting permutations of c and g before and after the symbol u in each of the 8 groups of 
sequences. The factors p p( ) / u1 1 2  and [ ( ) / ]p p p q u u u u1 1 1 2  found in coefficients v-
viii is discussed in §4.14 when the example at hand is generalized to yield an expression that 
applies to all possible cases. 
 
Coefficient i 
 1 u 1 = 1  (1 u 1 as well)  
Coefficient ii    
 1 u 2 = 2 or 1 u q    
Coefficient iii   
 3 u 1 = 3 or  p u 1 
Coefficient iv  
 3 u 2 = 6 or p u q 
Coefficient v  
 3 u 1 = 3 or  p p( )u u
1
1 2
1 
Coefficient vi  
 3 u 2 = 6 or  p p q( )u u
1
1 2
 
Coefficient vii  
 1 u 1 = 1 or  p p
p
( ) u
u u u
1 1
1 2
1  = 1u 1  
Coefficient viii  
 1 u 2 = 2  or  p p
p
q( ) uu u u
1 1
1 2
 = 1u q  
 
The coefficients pertaining to p exhibit the sequence 1 1  p p . This 1st sequence returns 
to 1. The coefficients pertaining to q exhibit the sequence 1 q . This 2nd sequence is 
characterized by 2 properties. First, the 2nd sequence is subordinated to, and expands, each 
single coefficient of the 1st sequence. The combined sequence is therefore 
1 1 1 1 1 1( ) ( ) ( ) ( )      q p q p q q . Second, the 2nd sequence does not return to 1. The 
reason for the 2nd characteristic is that the 8 sequences of picks that result in the undesired 
outcome of not picking a car when switching doors have been removed (see §4.9).  
 By uniting the coefficients i-viii with sequences i-viii, one obtains 8 products whose sum 
is the numerator of the probability that one will get at least 1 car by switching doors in the 
example at hand. The factor 1u  is explicitly expressed for transparency.  
 
Numerator part i: Sequence i with coefficient i 
 1 1 1 2 3 4u u   u  c c c c c( )( ) ( )( )  
Numerator part ii: Sequence ii with coefficient ii 
 1 1 2 3u u   u  q c c c c g o( )( ) ( )( )  
Numerator part iii: Sequence iii with coefficient iii 
 p c c g c cu u  u  1 1 2 3( ) ( )( )  
Numerator part iv: Sequence iv with coefficient iv  
 p q c c g c g ou u  u   ( ) ( )( )1 2 1  
Numerator part v: Sequence v with coefficient v 
 p p cg g c c( ) ( ) ( )( )u u u  u  
1
1 2
1 1 1 2  
Numerator part vi: Sequence vi with coefficient vi  
 p p q cg g c g o( ) ( ) ( )( )u u u  u   
1
1 2
1 1 2  
Numerator part vii: Sequence vii with coefficient vii  
 p p
p
g g g c c( ) ( )( ) ( ) uu u u u   u 
1 1
1 2
1 1 2 1  
Numerator part viii: Sequence viii with coefficient viii  
 p p
p
q g g g c g o( ) ( )( ) ( ) uu u u u   u  
1 1
1 2
1 2 3  
 
 It appears that, of the 8 numerator parts listed above, i and ii share common factors, as do 
iii and iv, v and vi, and vii and viii. When the common factors of the 2 members of each of the 
4 pairs of numerator parts are extracted and what remains is added up, one obtains 4 
compound numerator parts. In the following list, the factor 1u  is again retained for 
transparency. Furthermore, p p p( ) / u u u1 1 1 2  is the same as 1 u .  
 
Compound numerator part i+ii  
 1 1 2u  c c c( )( ) u [1 3 4u  ( )( )c c  q c g ou  ( )( )3 ]  
Compound numerator part iii+iv  
 p c c gu ( )1 u [ 1 2 3u  ( )( )c c  q c g ou   ( )( )2 1 ]  
Compound numerator part v+vi  
 p p cg g( ) ( )u u 
1
1 2
1 u [1 1 2u  ( )( )c c  q c g ou   ( )( )1 2 ]  
Compound numerator part vii+viii  
 p p
p
g g g( ) ( )( ) uu u u  
1 1
1 2
1 2 u [1 1u c c( )  q c g ou  ( )3 ]  
 
The sum of these 4 partial compound numerators constitutes the numerator of the probability 
that one will get at least 1 car by switching doors. The 4 probabilities in question can be 
presented more compactly as follows, among others because p p p( ) / u u u1 1 1 2 is the same 
as 1.  
 
i+ii:  c c c( )( ) 1 2  [ ( )( )c c 3 4  q c g o( )( ) 3 ]  
iii+iv: pc c g( )1  [ ( )( )c c 2 3  q c g o( )( )  2 1 ] 
v+vi: pcg g( )1  [ ( )( )c c 1 2  q c g o( )( )  1 2 ] 
vii+viii: g g g( )( ) 1 2  [ c c( )1  qc g o( )  3 ] 
 
Before deriving a general expression applying to all cases from the specific example at hand, it 
will be useful to complete the example by computing the probability that it involves of getting 
at least 1 car by switching doors.  
 
4.11. The Probability that One Will Get at least 1 Car by Switching in the Example at 
Hand  
 
Replacing the letters in the 4 partial compound numerators obtained at the end of §4.10 by the 
pertinent numbers and resolving the subtractions and the divisions yields the following partial 
numerators.  
 
i+ii:  5 4 3u u (2 1u  2 2 5u u )   
iii+iv: 3 5 4 7u u u (3 2u  2 3 4u u )  
v+vi: 3 5 7 6u u u (4 3u  2 4 3u u )  
vii+viii: 7 6 5u u (5 4u  2 5 2u u )  
 
The sum of these 4 sequences is, as it happens, exactly 45,000. This is the numerator of the 
probability that one will get at least 1 car by switching doors in the example at hand. The 
denominator is 12 11 10 7 6u u u u  (see §4.7) or 55,440. Consequently, the probability itself is 
45,000/55,440 or about 81.2%.  
 How does this probability compare with the probability of getting the car before 
switching, that is, the probability of getting at least 1 car in the 3 initial picks (p)? The 
probability of getting at least 1 car is the same as the probability of not picking a goat 3 times 
in a row in the 3 initial picks. The numerator of the probability of picking a goat 3 times in a 
row is g g g( )( ) 1 2  and the denominator is g g g( )( ) 1 2 . The probability in question is 
therefore 7 6 5u u / 12 11 10u u , or 7/24, or also about 29.2%. The probability of not picking 
a goat 3 times in a row, or also of picking at least 1 car, is therefore about 70.8%.  
 In other words, one does somewhat increase one’s chances of picking at least 1 car when 
switching doors, from about 70.8% to about 81.2%, by a little over 10%.  
 
4.12. A Key Difference between Monty Hall 1.0 and 2.0 and Monty Hall 3.0 and Higher 
 
What makes Monty Hall 3.0 much more interesting than Monty Hall 1.0 and 2.0 is the 
following. In Monty Hall 1.0 and 2.0, one always increases one’s chances of getting 1 car by 
switching doors when doors are opened to reveal goats [5]. But in Monty Hall 3.0 and higher, 
depending on the conditions and what the desired aim is, one’s chances of being successful by 
switching may either decrease or increase. A full study of these conditions exceeds the scope 
of the present paper. A complete understanding of them should make the construction of some 
titillating variants of the expanded Monty Hall problem possible. Some reflections follow in 
§6.  
 
4.13. First Generalization of the Numerator in the Example at Hand by Introducing 
Factorials  
 
So far, what has been obtained in regard to the example at hand is 4 compound products, the 
following (§4.10).  
 
i+ii:  c c c( )( ) 1 2  [ ( )( )c c 3 4  q c g o( )( ) 3 ]  
iii+iv: pc c g( )1  [ ( )( )c c 2 3  q c g o( )( )  2 1 ] 
v+vi: pcg g( )1  [ ( )( )c c 1 2  q c g o( )( )  1 2 ] 
vii+viii: g g g( )( ) 1 2  [ c c( )1  qc g o( )  3 ] 
 
The sum of these four compound products constitutes the numerator of the probability that one 
will get at least 1 car by switching doors in the example at hand of the extended Monty Hall 
problem. How to proceed from here?  
 In deductive thinking, there is no need for many examples or many experiments to obtain 
the truth about a matter as there is in inductive thinking. The truth can be seen in, and 
generalized from, a single example. In deriving the general truth about the probability at hand 
from the example at hand, the following observation can serve as a point of departure.  
 The number of cars or goats decreases by 1 with each successive pick of 1 car or 1 goat. 
Accordingly, the sequences of products of factors listed above can be interpreted as 
incomplete or partial factorials or snippets of factorials. For example, the sequence of factors 
in the product c c c( )( ) 1 2 , in this case 5 4 3u u , is part of the factorial c!, in this case 
5 4 3 2 1u u u u , or 5!. In cases in which there are fewer cars or goats than there are picks, a 
factor will reduce to zero and the probability of the sequence of picks of events in question 
will be 0.  
 In a next step, the partial factorial 5 4 3u u  can be obtained by dividing the complete 
factorial 5 4 3 2 1u u u u  by the rest of the factorial, namely 2 1u , or 2!. In this case, 
c c c( )( ) 1 2  equals c! divided by 2!. However, if c were 6 and not 5, c c c( )( ) 1 2  would 
equal c! divided by 3!. It is therefore desirable to generalize the expression of the division of a 
complete factorial by a partial factorial to any c. 
 In that regard, it appears that the relation between the number of the complete factorial c!  
and the number of the partial factorial is always the same. The number of the partial factorial 
is always c  3 because the number of the picks is always 3 however many cars there are. The 
divisions of complete factorials by partial factorials can therefore be generalized by expressing 
the number of the partial factorial in its relation to the number of the complete factorial. In the 
case at hand, the partial factor can be expressed as ( )!c  3  and the division of the complete 
factorial by the partial factorial as c c/ ( )! 3 . By this same procedure, the 4 partial 
numerators listed above can be converted into the following equivalents.  
 
i+ii:  c
c
!
( )! 3 u   [
( )!
( )!
c
c


3
5
 q ( )!
( )!
c
c


3
4
u ( )!
( )!
g o
g o

 1 ]  
iii+iv: p c
c
!
( )! 2 u
g
g
!
( )!1 u  [
( )!
( )!
c
c


2
4
 q ( )!
( )!
c
c


2
3
u ( )!
( )!
g o
g o
 
 
1
2
]  
v+vi: p c
c
!
( )!1 u
g
g
!
( )! 2 u  [
( )!
( )!
c
c


1
3
 q ( )!
( )!
c
c


1
2
u ( )!
( )!
g o
g o
 
 
2
3
]  
vii+viii:      g
g
!
( )! 3 u  [
c
c
!
( )! 2  q
c
c
!
( )!1 u
( )!
( )!
g o
g o
 
 
3
4
]  
 
By being converted into c c!/ ( )! 3 , an expression such as c c c( )( ) 1 2  has been generalized 
to a certain degree. But it is still specific in that it only applies when p is 3. In fact, all the 
terms in the equivalents listed above only apply when p is 3 and q is 2. The need is for 
converting the terms into expressions that apply to any p and any c.  
 But before proceeding to the generalization to any p and any c, it is necessary to detail the 
general structure of coefficients. The coefficients relate to how many times each of the 
possible sequences of picks are taken. They have already been discussed provisionally in 
§4.10. The need at this point is for a general treatment.  
 
4.14. The Structure of Coefficients  
 
The coefficients of the Equation pertaining to the extended Monty Hall problem exhibit the 
same structure as the coefficients of the power of a compound quantity that consists of two 
members, that is, ( )a b n . The basic facts about this structure have been well-known for 
more than four centuries. They involve the numbers that are also found in Pascal’s 
Arithmetical Triangle. How these numbers are obtained may be briefly reviewed below to 
make the present account fully self-sufficient. A particularly lucid and at the same time 
delightfully parsimonious presentation of the matter at hand is Euler’s in his “Elements of 
Algebra” [6].  
 The number of the coefficients (that is, how many coefficients there are) of a compound 
quantity consisting of 2 members a and b raised to the power n, that is, ( )a b n , equals the 
number of the power of the compound quantity, that is, n, augmented by 1, or n 1. The 
number n 1 is also the number of ways in which the 2 members can be arranged in regard to 
how often they are taken. Thus, ( )a b 5 yields 6 coefficients, that is, the power 5 plus 1. 
Accordingly, there are 6 arrangements when it comes to how often the 2 members a and b of 
the compound quantity can be taken. One can take 5 times a and 0 times b, 4 times a and 1 
time b, 3 times a and 2 times b, 2 times a and 3 times b, 1 time a and 4 times b, and 0 times a 
and 5 times b. If the items are multiplied, the 6 arrangements are as follows: aaaaa, aaaab, 
aaabb, aabbb, abbbb, and bbbbb, which can also be written as a5, a4b, a3b2, a2b3, a1b4, and b5. 
The 6 arrangements are the 6 main terms of the compound quantity. Each main term has its 
own coefficient.  
 The coefficient numbers (that is, what the numbers of each individual coefficient are) are 
determined by the number of the ways in which the 2 members of the compound quantity can 
be ordered in each of the arrangements that relate to how often they are taken. The elements 
can be ordered in only 1 way in aaaaa. Accordingly, the coefficient of a5 is 1. There are 5 
ways of ordering the elements in aaaab, namely aaaab, aaaba, aabaa, abaaa, and baaaa. 
Accordingly, the coefficient of a4b is 5. Along these same lines, the coefficients of a3b2, a2b3, 
a1b4, and b5 can be determined to be 10, 10, 5, and 1 respectively.  
 In sum, ( )a b 5 equals a5 + 5a4b + 10a3b2 + 10a2b3 + 5a1b4 + b5.  
 Coefficient numbers can also be obtained as follows without having to count ways of 
ordering elements. If all the letters are different, as in abcde, the number of ways in which the 
letters can be ordered is the factorial of the number of letters, in this case 5! If 2 letters are the 
same, as in abcdd, 5! needs to be divided by 2! Therefore, in aaabb, 5! needs to be divided by 
both 3! and 2! The result is 10. Furthermore, 5!/(3!2!), or (5 4 3 2 1u u u u )/(3 2 1 2 1u u u u ), 
equals ( 5 4 3u u )/(1 2 3u u ). The 6 coefficients 1, 5, 10, 10, 5, and 1 therefore equal 1, 5/1, 
( 5 4u )/(1 2u ), (5 4 3u u )/(1 2 3u u ), (5 4 3 2u u u )/(1 2 3 4u u u ), and 
( 5 4 3 2 1u u u u )/(1 2 3 4 5u u u u ) respectively.  
 The progression of the coefficients from 1st term to last term can be generalized as follows 
for any power n.  
 
 1, n
1
, n n( )u
1
1 2
, n n n( )( ) u u
1 2
1 2 3
,  . . . , n n n n n
n
( )( ) ... [ ( )]
... ( )
  u u  
u u u u 
1 2 2
1 2 3 1
,  
  n n n n n
n
( )( ) ... [ ( )]
...
  u u  
u u u u
1 2 1
1 2 3
 = 1 
 
The last 2 coefficients can also be written as  
 
 n n n
n
( )( ) ...
... ( )
  u u
u u u u 
1 2 2
1 2 3 1
 and n n n
n
( )( ) ...
...
  u u
u u u u
1 2 1
1 2 3
.  
 
The 1st coefficient is always 1 because there is only 1 way of ordering the 1st term. The last 
term also equals 1 for the same reason.  
 The coefficients involved in the extended Monty Hall problem are likewise obtained as the 
ways in which 2 elements can be ordered in each of the arrangements that relate to how often 
the 2 elements are taken. In this case, the coefficients do not equal the number of a power plus 
1, but rather the number of picks of doors plus 1. The symbol a of the compound quantity 
corresponds to picking a car; the symbol b, to not picking a car or to picking a goat.  
 Each term of the compound quantity discussed above has only 1 coefficient. By contrast, 
each term of the probability sought in the extended Monty Hall problem has 2 coefficients if 
there are 2 events of picking more than 1 door and therefore 1 event of switching doors. The 
1st coefficient of these 2 coefficients is derived from the number of picks in the 1st event of 
picking doors, that is, p. The 2nd coefficient is derived from the number of picks in the 2nd 
event of picking doors, that is, q. The progression of the 1st coefficient is obtained by 
replacing n by p in the progression listed above. The progression of the 2nd coefficient is 
obtained by replacing n by q in the progression listed above and leaving out the last term. The 
penultimate term of the progression of the coefficient q therefore becomes the last. It is as 
follows.  
 
 q q q
q q
( )( ) ...
... ( )( )
  u u u
u u u u  
1 2 3 2
1 2 3 2 1
 
 
Or also as follows.  
 
 q q q q q q q
q q
( )( ) ... [ ( )][ ( )]
... ( )( )
  u u    
u u u u  
1 2 3 2
1 2 3 2 1
  
 
The reason for the removal of the last term along with its coefficient is the removal of the 
undesired scenarios in which 0 cars are picked in the 2nd event of picking doors.  
 The number of the coefficients that each term has increases with, and is the same as, the 
number of events of picking more than 1 door. It also increases with, but is 1 less than, the 
number of events of switching doors. 
 
4.15. The Relation between the Probability of a Sum of Partial Sequences of Picks, either 
Anterior or Posterior, to the Probability of the Sum of the Full Sequence of Picks  
 
The quest involved in the Monty Hall problem and its extensions is first to establish both the 
probability of achieving an end by picking doors before doors are opened and the probability 
of achieving that same end by picking doors after doors have been opened and then to 
compare the two in order to determine whether, after picking doors, one improves one’s 
chances by switching to other doors after doors have been opened.  
 In the example at hand, there are 32 different sequences of picking 5 doors that lead to 
getting at least 1 car by switching doors (§4.10) and hence 32 different numerators of the 
probabilities of the sequences conceived as single events. An example of a numerator is 
c c c( )( ) 1 2  u  ( )( )c c 3 4 . It pertains to the sequence in which all picks are car picks. 
The denominator is the same for all 32 sequences, namely d d d( )( ) 1 2  u  
( )( )d o c o   3 4 .  
 The probability of an individual car or goat pick conceived as a single event is expressed 
as a ratio of a number of available cars or goats to a number of available doors. But a sequence 
of picks can also be conceived as a single event. Its probability is the product of the 
probabilities that all individual picks belonging to the sequence would have if each were 
conceived as a single event. 
 Many of the probabilities of individual picks in the example at hand are conditional or 
dependent. A probability of an event is dependent if it is in part determined by what happens 
in a prior event. In other words, the probability would have been different if the earlier event 
had not taken place. For example, when a goat pick is the 1st goat pick of a sequence of picks, 
its probability, namely g/d, is independent. But when a goat pick is the 2nd goat pick of a 
sequence, the numerator of its probability will be g 1, one less goat being available because 
of what happened in the 1st goat pick. The denominator will be d 1 if the 2nd goat pick 
immediately follows the first. 
 Each of the 32 sequences of 5 picks in the example at hand consists of an anterior 
sequence of 3 picks before doors are opened and a posterior sequence of 2 picks after doors 
have been opened. The probability of either an anterior or a posterior sequence is the product 
of the probabilities that all individual picks belonging to the anterior or posterior sequence 
would have if each were conceived as a single event. 
 The 32 sequences of 5 picks constitute all possible cases. Furthermore, the 32 sequences 
are exclusive events. No 2 sequences can happen at the same time. Or, one or the other of the 
sequences must be the case. The sum of their probabilities is therefore 1 or 100%.  
 The 32 sequences can be collectively evaluated in search of certain properties. In the 
example at hand, the first 3 picks are evaluated in order to single out those sequences in which 
one gets at least 1 car in those 3 picks. Each sequence is an event with its own probability. 
Moreover, the sequences are exclusive events. The probability of all the sequences in which 
one gets at least 1 car in the first 3 picks is the sum of the probabilities of getting at least 1 car 
in each sequence. The 4th and 5th picks are next evaluated in order to single out those 
sequences in which one gets at least 1 car in those 2 picks. The probability of all the sequences 
of 5 picks in which this condition is met is the sum of the probabilities of the individual 
sequences.  
 But what about the probability of what happens in the 4th and 5th picks in all those 
sequences in which one gets at least 1 car in the first 3 picks? And what about the probability 
of what happens in the first 3 picks in all those sequences in which one gets at least 1 car in 
the 4th or 5th picks? It appears that all possible cases are considered in those other picks. The 
probability of each case will vary depending on what happens in the remaining picks of the 
full the sequence. But the total probability of all possible cases is 1 or 100%. It follows that, to 
obtain the probability of the sum of the full sequences of 5 picks that have been selected on 
the basis of what happens either in the anterior or in the posterior sequence of picks, one 
multiplies the sum of the probabilities of the anterior or the posterior sequences of picks with 
the total probability of either the posterior or the anterior sequences of picks, which is 1. Since 
multiplication by 1 does not change a number, the probability of the sum of all the full 
sequences of 5 picks that have been selected is the same as the probability of what happens 
either in the anterior or the posterior sequences alone.  
 Consider the example at hand, in which the aim is to get at least 1 car. Once the sequences 
in which one gets at least 1 car in the posterior sequences have been selected from among the 
32 sequences listed in §4.8, it is possible to evaluate the total probability of all that happens in 
the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd picks preceding each of the selected sequences. This total probability is the 
sum of all the probabilities of each of the ways in which the first 3 doors can be picked. The 
denominator shared by all these probabilities is also the denominator of the total probability, 
namely d d d( )( ) 1 2 . The numerator of the total probability is the sum of the numerators of 
the probabilities of all 8 possible sequences of car picks and goat picks, as follows: 
c c c( )( ) 1 2 , c c g( )1 , cg c( )1 , gc c( )1 , cg g( )1 , gc g( )1 , g g c( )1 , and  
g g g( )( ) 1 2 . These 8 sequences can be brought out in front as common factors in the 
selected sequences of 5 picks. Thus, as the picking of doors proceeds from the 1st pick to the 
2nd pick and then on to the 3rd pick, the numerator of the probability of what happens in the 
first 3 picks is the sum of the 8 combinations of 3 picks just listed and the denominator is 
d d d( )( ) 1 2 . In numerical terms, the sought denominator is 12 12 1 12 2( )( )  , or 
12 11 10u u , that is, 1320. The numerator is 5 5 1 5 2( )( )     5 5 1 7( )    5 7 5 1u ( )    
7 5 5 1u ( )    57 7 1( )    7 5 7 1u ( )    7 7 1 5( )    7 7 1 7 2( )( )  , or 5 4 3u u    
5 4 7u u    5 7 4u u    7 5 4u u    5 7 6u u    7 5 6u u    7 6 5u u    7 6 5u u , that is 
1320. The total probability is hence 1320/1320 or 1, or also 100%.  
 If instead the full sequences in which one gets at least 1 car in the anterior sequences are 
selected from among the 32 sequences listed in §4.8, the numerators of the probabilities of the 
anterior sequences of the full sequences that are being selected will be the following 7: 
c c c( )( ) 1 2 , c c g( )1 , cg c( )1 , gc c( )1 , cg g( )1 , and gc g( )1 . In other words, 
g g g( )( ) 1 2  is not selected. The denominator of the same probabilities will always be the 
same, namely d d d( )( ) 1 2 . To compute the probability in question, a shortcut is possible 
(§4.11 end). The probability can be obtained by computing the probability of getting 3 goats in 
a row, which is the only scenario in which one does not get at least 1 car, and subtracting that 
probability from 1 or 100%. The probability in question is about 70.8% (§4.11 end). The total 
probability of the posterior sequences will be 1 because all possibilities of what can happen in 
the posterior picks are being considered.  
 In the Monty Hall problem, sums of full sequences of picks are selected first on the basis 
of what happens in the anterior sequences and then on the basis of what happens in the 
posterior sequences and the two resulting probabilities are compared. The anterior sequences 
will differ in the two selections. And so will the posterior sequences.  
 The purpose of the Monty Hall problem and its extensions is to compare the probability of 
sums of anterior sequences with the probability of sums of posterior sequences. Naturally, 
only picks belonging to anterior sequences can be considered in computing the total 
probability of sums of anterior sequences and the same applies in the case of posterior 
sequences. It is therefore not permissible, when generalizing the probabilities of the example 
at hand through the addition of factorials to unite into a single product probabilities of anterior 
car picks and probabilities of posterior car picks. Consider, for example, sequence iv in ’ 4.10: 
c c g( )1  u  ( )( )c g o  2 1 . It is possible to rearrange this sequence as c c c( )( ) 1 2  u  
g g o( ) 1 , bringing goat picks and car picks together. The temptation might arise to 
generalize c c c( )( ) 1 2  as c!/ ( )!c  3  in an attempt to obtain a more general expression of 
the probability that is sought, namely of getting at least 1 car when switching doors. But the 
expression c!/ ( )!c  3  cannot be part of the expression of either an anterior probability or a 
posterior probability because it mixes elements of both.  
 
4.16. Second Generalization in Terms of p and q of the Integers of the Example at 
Hand’s Factorialized Numerator  
 
The next step is to generalize the integers in the expressions at the end of §4.13 in terms of p 
and q. The expressions are repeated here for ease of reference, as follows.  
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The sum of these expressions is the probability that one will pick at least 1 car by switching 
doors after doors have been opened. It will be observed that, as one moves from sequence i to 
sequence viii, the integers pertaining to car picks decrease whereas the integers pertaining to 
goat picks increase. What is happening here and how does it relate to p and q?  
 At the outset of the sequences, in sequence i, the picks are all car picks. But by the end, in 
sequence viii, the picks are all goat picks. In each anterior or posterior sequence, there is a 
certain potential to pick cars or goats. But there is a limit to this potential. One cannot pick 
more cars or goats than there are picks. The maximum potential is therefore p in anterior 
sequences of picks, q in posterior sequences if picks, and p q in an anterior and a posterior 
sequence combined.  
 At the outset of the sequences, in sequence i, the potential to pick cars is fully exploited. In 
other words, nothing is taken or subtracted from the potential. By contrast, everything is taken 
from the potential to pick goats. However, by the end, in sequence viii, it is the potential to 
pick goats that is fully exploited. Or nothing is taken from that potential.  
 It has already been noted that the numerators and denominators of the probabilities of 
sequences of car or goat picks can be considered partial factorials. These partial factorials can 
be presented in general fashion by dividing the full factorial by the factorial whose number is 
the number that follows the last number of the partial factorial. For example, in the partial 
factorial c c c( )( ) 1 2 , the last number is c  2 . The number that follows c  2 is c  3. The 
partial factorial c c c( )( ) 1 2 can therefore be presented as the full factorial c! divided by the 
full factorial ( )!c  3   
 At the same time, it is seen that the integer 3 is in fact p. After p car picks, the number of 
available cars has decreased by p and the numerator of the probability of picking a car in the 
next, 4th, pick is therefore c  3, or generally c p , because that is how many cars are still 
available. But this number is also the number of the full factorial by which the full factorial c! 
must be divided to represent the sequence c c c( )( ) 1 2 in terms of c! The sequence 
c c c( )( ) 1 2 can therefore be represented as c!/ ( )!c  3  By sequence viii, everything or full p 
is taken away from the potential p of picking cars. Accordingly, the numerator of the 
probability of picking cars may be presented as c!/ [ ( )]!c p p  , or as c!/ ( )!c  0 , or also as 
c!/c!, which is the same as 1. In other words, the probability of picking cars vanishes because 
no cars are picked.  
 In the expression c!/ ( )!c  2  in sequence iii, the integer 2 is only valid when p = 3. In 
generalizing the expressions for all p, it appears that 2 = p 1. Accordingly, the expression 
can be generalized as c!/ [ ( )]!c p 1   
 In the expression c!/ ( )!c 1  in sequence v, the integer is valid for all p, but only because 
sequence v is the penultimate sequence in its progression from beginning to end. As the 
expression c 1 follows c p ( )0  and c p ( )1 and precedes c p p ( ) , it can likewise 
be styled in terms of what is subtracted from p as c p p  [ ( )]1 .  
 In the following presentation, the integers in the sequences found at the end of ’ 4.13 are 
interpreted in terms of p and q. The expressions are presented as explicitly as possible for 
maximum transparency. They are also added up because their sum consists of the numerators 
of the probability of getting at least 1 car when switching doors.  
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Some expressions are simplified in the following equivalent. The expressions remain 
unambiguous while becoming somewhat less transparent.  
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This expression still reflects the values p = 3 and q = 2. There is a progression of 4 terms 
outside of the square brackets, 1 more than the value of p. Inside the square brackets, there is a 
progression of, not 3 terms or 1 more than q, but just 2 because the 3rd term is omitted as it 
concerns picking no cars in the posterior sequence of picks.  
 
4.17. Generalization of the Numerator to Any p or q  
 
In the generalization of the numerator to any p or q, there should be p 1 different coefficients 
in regard to the coefficient p and q different coefficients in regard to the coefficient q, that is, 
q 1 minus 1 omitted coefficient, namely the last coefficient, which concerns picking no cars 
in the posterior sequence.  
 In the following generalized formula, there are 5 coefficients in terms of p, the first 4 and 
the last, and 5 coefficients in terms of q, the first 4 and the penultimate one. The sums are 
infinitely expandable at every instance of the expression + . . .+ . A more reduced form, still 
unambiguous but a little less transparent, has been anticipated in section §4.1. In case either p 
or q is equal to 3 or less, there will be fewer than 5 coefficients for either p or q.  
 
1 u c
c p
!
[ ( )]!  0 u
g
g p p
!
{ [ ( )]}!   0
 
 u [1 u [ ( )]!
[ ( ) ( ]!
c p
c p q
 
   
0
0 0
 
  u { [ ( )]}!
{ [ ( )] [ ( )]}!
g o p p
g o p p q q
   
      
0
0 0
 
  q
1
u [ ( )]!
[ ( ) ( )]!
c p
c p q
 
   
0
0 1
 
  u { [ ( )]}!
{ [ ( )] [ ( )]}!
g o p p
g o p p q q
   
      
0
0 1
 
  q q( )u
1
1 2
u [ ( )]!
[ ( ) ( )]!
c p
c p q
 
   
0
0 2
 
  u { [ ( )]}!
{ [ ( )] [ ( )]}!
g o p p
g o p p q q
   
      
0
0 2
 
  q q q( )( ) u u
1 2
1 2 3
u [ ( )]!
[ ( ) ( )]!
c p
c p q
 
   
0
0 3
 
  u { [ ( )]}!
{ [ ( )] [ ( )]}!
g o p p
g o p p q q
   
      
0
0 3
 
  . . .  q q q q q q q
q q
( )( ) ... [ ( )][ ( )]
... ( )( )
  u u    
u u u u  
1 2 3 2
1 2 3 2 1
 
  u [ ( )]!
{ ( ) [ ( )]}!
c p
c p q q
 
    
0
0 1
  
  u { [ ( )]!
[ ( )] { [ ( )]} !
g o p p
g o p p q q q
   
       
0
0 1
]  
 
  p
1
u c
c p
!
[ ( )]! 1 u
g
g p p
!
{ [ ( )]}!  1  
  u  [1 u [ ( )]!
[ ( ) ( )]!
c p
c p q
 
   
1
1 1  
   u { [ ( )]}!
{ [ ( )] [ ( )]}!
g o p p
g o p p q q
   
      
1
1 0
 
  
q
1
u [ ( )]!
[ ( ) ( )]!
c p
c p q
 
   
1
1 1
 
   u { [ ( )]}!
{ [ ( )] [ ( )]}!
g o p p
g o p p q q
   
      
1
1 1
 
 
q q( )
u
1
1 2
u [ ( )]!
[ ( ) ( )]!
c p
c p q
 
   
1
1 2
 
   u { [ ( )]}!
{ [ ( )] [ ( )]}!
g o p p
g o p p q q
   
      
1
1 2
  
 
q q q( )( ) 
u u
1 2
1 2 3
u [ ( )]!
[ ( ) ( )]!
c p
c p q
 
   
1
1 3
 
   u { [ ( )]}!
{ [ ( )] [ ( )]}!
g o p p
g o p p q q
   
      
1
1 3
 
  . . .   
q q q q q q q
q q
( )( ) ... [ ( )][ ( )]
... ( )( )
  u u    
u u u u  
1 2 3 2
1 2 3 2 1
  
  u [ ( )]!
{ ( ) [ ( )]}!
c p
c p q q
 
    
1
1 1  
  u { [ ( )]}!
{ [ ( )] { [ ( )]} !
g o p p
g o p p q q q
   
       
1
1 1
] 
 
 p p( )u
1
1 2
u c
c p
!
[ ( )]!  2 u
g
g p p
!
{ [ ( )]}!   2  
 u [1 u [ ( )]!
[ ( ) ( )]!
c p
c p q
 
   
2
2 0
  
  u { [ ( )]}!
{ [ ( )] [ ( )]}!
g o p p
g o p p q q
   
      
2
2 0
 
 
q
1
u [ ( )]!
[ ( ) ( )]!
c p
c p q
 
   
2
2 1
 
  u { [ ( )]}!
{ [ ( )] [ ( )]}!
g o p p
g o p p q q
   
      
2
2 1
 
 
q q( )
u
1
1 2
u [ ( )]!
[ ( ) ( )]!
c p
c p q
 
   
2
2 2
 
   u { [ ( )]}!
{ [ ( )] [ ( )]}!
g o p p
g o p p q q
   
      
2
2 2
 
 
q q q( )( ) 
u u
1 2
1 2 3
u [ ( )]!
[ ( ) ( )]!
c p
c p q
 
   
2
2 3
 
  u  { [ ( )]}!
{ [ ( )] [ ( )]}!
g o p p
g o p p q q
   
      
2
2 3
 
   . . .   
q q q q q q q
q q
( )( ) ... [ ( )][ ( )]
... ( )( )
  u u    
u u u u  
1 2 3 2
1 2 3 2 1
 
   u [ ( )]!
{ ( ) [ ( )]}!
c p
c p q q
 
    
2
2 1
 
   u { [ ( )]}!
[ ( )] { [ ( )]} !
g o p p
g o p p q q q
   
       
2
2 1
]  
 
 p p p( )( ) u u
1 2
1 2 3
u c
c p
!
[ ( )]!  3 u
g
g p p
!
{ [ ( )]}!   3  
 u [1 u [ ( )]!
[ ( ) ( )]!
c p
c p q
 
   
3
3 0
 
  u { [ ( )]}!
{ [ ( )] [ ( )]}!
g o p p
g o p p q q
   
      
3
3 0
  
 
q
1
u [ ( )]!
[ ( ) ( )]!
c p
c p q
 
   
3
3 1
 
  u { [ ( )]}!
{ [ ( )] [ ( )]}!
g o p p
g o p p q q
   
      
3
3 1
 
 
q q( )
u
1
1 2
u [ ( )]!
[ ( ) ( )]!
c p
c p q
 
   
3
3 2
 
  u { [ ( )]}!
{ [ ( )] [ ( )]}!
g o p p
g o p p q q
   
      
3
3 2
 
 
q q q( )( ) 
u u
1 2
1 2 3
u [ ( )]!
[ ( ) ( )]!
c p
c p q
 
   
3
3 3  
  u { [ ( )]}!
{ [ ( )] [ ( )]}!
g o p p
g o p p q q
   
      
3
3 3
 
  . . .   
q q q q q q q
q q
( )( ) ... [ ( )][ ( )]
... ( )( )
  u u    
u u u u  
1 2 3 2
1 2 3 2 1
 
  u [ ( )]!
{ ( ) [ ( )]}!
c p
c p q q
 
    
3
3 1
 
  u { [ ( )]}!
[ ( )] { [ ( )]} !
g o p p
g o p p q q q
   
       
3
3 1
] 
  . . . 
p p p p p p p
p p
( )( ) ... [ ( )][ ( )]
... ( )
  u u    
u u u u 
1 2 2 1
1 2 3 1
 
  u c
c p p
!
[ ( )]!  u
g
g p p p
!
{ [ ( )]}!    
 u [1 u [ ( )]!
[ ( ) ( )]!
c p p
c p p q
 
    0  
  u { [ ( )]}!
{ [ ( )] [ ( )]}!
g o p p p
g o p p p q q
   
       0  
 
q
1
u [ ( )]!
[ ( ) ( )]!
c p p
c p p q
 
   1  
  u { [ ( )]}!
{ [ ( )] [ ( )]}!
g o p p p
g o p p p q q
   
      1  
 
q q( )
u
1
1 2
u [ ( )]!
[ ( ) ( )]!
c p p
c p p q
 
    2  
  u { [ ( )]}!
{ [ ( )] [ ( )]}!
g o p p p
g o p p p q q
   
       2  
 
q q q( )( ) 
u u
1 2
1 2 3
u [ ( )]!
[ ( ) ( )]!
c p p
c p p q
 
    3  
  u { [ ( )]}!
{ [ ( )] [ ( )]}!
g o p p p
g o p p p q q
   
       3  
  . . . 
q q q q q q q
q q
( )( ) ... [ ( )][ ( )]
... ( )( )
  u u    
u u u u  
1 2 3 2
1 2 3 2 1
 
  u [ ( )]!
{ ( ) [ ( )]}!
c p p
c p p q q
 
    1  
  u { [ ( )]}!
[ ( )] { [ ( )]} !
g o p p p
g o p p p q q q
   
       1 ]  
 
5. General Observations on Other Desired Outcomes in Monty Hall 3.0  
 
In the special case of Monty Hall 3.0 described in §4, the desired outcome is getting at least 1 
car. But countless other outcomes may be desired. Among them are getting exactly 1 car, 
getting at least 2 cars, and getting exactly 2 cars, all both before and after doors are opened, as 
well as getting 2 cars before doors are opened and just 1 car after doors are opened. Not only 
the number but also the order of the picks can be specified. For example, the desired outcome 
might be to get at least 1 car in the last door pick, and that both before and after doors are 
opened. I hope to treat Monty Hall 3.0 more comprehensively elsewhere and establish the 
relation to the common modern probability concept of hypergeometric distribution. What 
follows are some general observations anticipating a more detailed treatment.  
 The main observation is as follows: There is no general formula, even though certain 
abbreviations are possible. The basic procedure is the same for all desired outcomes in Monty 
Hall 3.0. First, the equation in §4.1 is expanded from just the cases in which one gets at least 1 
car to all possible cases, which have a probability of 1 or 100%. The different desired 
outcomes are then different selections from the equation describing the probability of all 
possible cases. For fixed sequences of car picks and goat picks, coefficients need to be 
dropped [7].  
 Suppose that the desired outcome is getting cars with every pick of a door. This is just one 
case of many. It is in fact a very specific case of Monty Hall 3.1. The equation in §4.1 will 
shrink maximally. The probability of achieving the aim at hand in the anterior picks is as 
follows.  
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The probability of achieving the aim in the posterior picks is as follows. 
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And therefore also as follows.  
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The factor by which one increases or decreases one’s chances is then the following.  
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6. Monty Hall 3.1: Some Reflections on Evaluating whether Chances of Success Increase 
or Decrease in Monty Hall 3.0  
 
The original Monty Hall problem, Monty Hall 1.0, was designed as a challenge. The challenge 
becomes somewhat uninteresting in the expansion styled as Monty Hall 2.0 as soon as one 
realizes that one’s chances always increase if doors hiding goats are opened. Nothing piques 
human attention more than the hope of doing better or winning or the fear of doing worse or 
losing, let alone the combination of the two when one is not really certain whether one will 
win or lose.  
 The quintessential uncertainty returns with Monty Hall 3.0, in which switching doors can 
result in either a decrease or an increase of one’s chances. It is still a fact that, as in Monty 
Hall 1.0 and 2.0, the opening of doors always increases one’s chances. Nor will one’s chances 
decrease under those conditions if q is at the same time either the same as, or larger than, p. 
However, one’s chances decrease when q is smaller than p. The key question then is whether 
the increase caused by opening doors is greater or smaller than the decrease caused by 
diminishing the number of picks from p to q. The systematic study of the mathematical 
conditions that determine whether one or the other is the case in Monty Hall 3.0 may be styled 
provisionally as Monty Hall 3.1.  
 Let it suffice to present in this section examples in which the combined opening of doors 
and diminution of picks yields either an increase or a decrease in chances of getting a car. Let 
there be 6 doors and 1 car. Furthermore, let the number of picks decrease from p to q in that p 
= 2 and q = 1.  
 One’s chances of getting the car in the 2 initial picks (p) are 11/36. That is because the 
chance of not picking a car in the 2 initial picks twice in succession is 5/6u 5/6 or 25/36 and 
1 25 36 / is 11/36 or about 30.6%. The chance that the car is hiding behind one of the 4 
remaining doors is 25/36.  
 If 3 of the 4 remaining doors are opened to reveal a goat, the probability of 25/36 of 
getting the car is compressed into the sole door that has neither been initially picked nor 
opened to reveal goats. One will therefore more than double one’s chances of getting the car 
by switching doors even though one’s picks are reduced from 2 to 1.  
 If 2 of the 4 remaining doors are opened to reveal a goat, the probability of 25/36 of 
getting the car is compressed into 2 doors that have neither been initially picked nor opened to 
reveal goats. The probability of 25/36 is distributed over those 2 doors, the chance that either 
door hides the car being 25/(36u 2) or 25/72 or about 34.7%. One therefore still gains a small 
advantage of about 4% by switching doors.  
 If 1 of the 4 remaining doors is opened to reveal a goat, the probability of 25/36 of getting 
the car is compressed into 3 doors. The probability is therefore distributed over those 3 doors. 
The chance that either door hides the car is therefore 25/(36u 3) or 25/108 or about 23.1%. In 
this case, one’s chances of getting the car by switching decrease by between 11% and 12%.  
 
7. Monty Hall 4.0: Additional Generalization to Any Number of Switches of Doors (s)  
 
The generalization of the Monty Hall problem to any number of switches of doors (s) is styled 
here as Monty Hall 4.0. The following description of this generalization is limited to cases in 
which only 1 door is picked, as in the original Monty Hall problem (Monty Hall 1.0).  
 The probability of getting 1 car when switching doors any number of times is as follows, 
with s being the number of times that one switches doors, o1 being the number of doors opened 
to reveal goats at the 1st opening of doors, o2 the number of additional doors opened at the 2nd 
opening of doors, and so on.  
 
 c d d o d s o o o
d d o d o o d s o o o o
s s
s s
( )( )...( ... )
( )( )...( ... )
       
          
 

1 2
1 2
1 1 2 1
1 1 2 1 2 1
  (a) 
 
 But before describing how this expression is obtained, it may be useful to look at the 
generalization at hand in a more intuitive way by means of an example.  
 An example is as follows. Let there be 1 car and 6 doors and therefore 5 goats. An 
intuitive analysis is as follows. Making a diagram may be useful in following this analysis. If 
one picks a door, there is a chance of 1/6 of getting the car and a chance of 5/6 that the 5 other 
doors are hiding the car. If 2 of those 5 other doors are then opened to reveal 2 goats, the 
chance of 5/6 is compressed into the 3 unopened doors of those 5 other doors. That means that 
each of the 3 other doors has a chance of 5/(6u 3) or 5/18 of hiding the car. If one switches to 
1 of those 3 doors, one increases one’s chances of getting the car from 1/6 to 5/18. This also 
means that there is a chance of 10/18 or 5/18 + 5/18 that the other 2 of the 3 doors to which 
one could have switched hide the car. If 1 of those 2 other doors is now opened to reveal a 
goat in a 2nd round of opening doors, then the probability of 10/18 is compressed in the 1 
remaining door that has been neither picked nor opened. Therefore, if one switches a 2nd time, 
now to that 1 remaining door, one doubles one’s chances of getting the car from 5/18 to 10/18.  
 But what happens when, switching a 2nd time, one switches back to the door that was 
picked first? This door retains its probability of 1/6 or 3/18. In other words, after the 2 rounds 
of opening doors, first 2 doors and then 1 door, there are 3 doors still to be considered: (1) the 
door originally picked; (2) the door picked by switching; (3) the door to which one could 
switch by switching a 2nd time. The probabilities that these three doors hide the car are (1) 
3/18 or 1/6, (2) 5/18, and (3) 10/18 respectively. This fact again illustrates the counterintuitive 
character of the Monty Hall problem and its extensions.  
 For let there be 1,000,000 doors and 1 car. At 1st pick, one has a chance of 1/1,000,000 of 
getting the car. There is a chance of 999,999/1,000,000 that the car is hiding behind 1 of the 
other doors. If 999,996 doors are now opened to reveal goats, there are 3 doors left to which 
one could switch. They share the probability of 999,999/1,000,000 of hiding the car and each 
therefore has a probability of 999,999/3,000,000. Let us assume that one switches to 1 of these 
3 doors. The chances that the car is hiding behind 1 of the other 2 doors to which one does not 
switch are therefore 2u 999,999/3,000,000 or 1,999,998/3,000,000. If 1 of these 3 doors is 
now opened to reveal 1 goat, the 1 remaining door has a chance of 1,999,998/3,000,000 of 
hiding the car. Thus, it may strain the imagination, but it is also undeniably true, that the 3 
remaining unopened doors hold the following probabilities of hiding the car: (1) 3/3,000,000; 
(2) 999,999/3,000,000; (3) 1,999,998/3,000,000. Actual tests involving millions if not billions 
of trials, real or computer-simulated, would without any doubt confirm this fact. Similar tests 
of this kind have in fact been done in connection with related problems.  
 What happens if the door that one originally picked is opened? There are 2 possibilities. 
The 1st possibility is that the car is hiding behind that door. At this point, every consideration 
of probability instantly comes to naught because it is now 100% certain which door is hiding 
the car. There is no longer any probability problem because there is no longer probability but 
rather certainty. The 2nd possibility is that a goat is hiding behind that door. At this juncture, 
the situation completely changes. The door in question so far had a chance of 1/6 of hiding the 
car. It is now certain that it does not hide the car. The probability that it hides the car therefore 
drops to 0. Accordingly, the 5 other doors had so far a chance of 5/6 of hiding the car. Now it 
appears that these 5 doors have a chance of 100% of hiding the car. In addition, 2 doors have 
been opened in the 1st round of opening doors revealing goats. Consequently, the probability 
that the 3 other doors hide is 100%. Each of the 3 other doors therefore has a probability of 1/3 
of hiding the car. At this point, we are back at the original Monty Hall problem (Monty Hall 
1.0).  
 Now back to the generalized expression (a) above. How is it obtained? It can be obtained 
by generalizing the case of 2 switches of doors (s = 2) to any number of switches of doors. 
When there are 2 switches, there are 8 possible sequences of car picks and door picks, as 
follows: (1) ccc, (2) ccg, (3) cgc, (4) gcc, (5) cgg, (6) gcg, (7) ggc, and (8) ggg. The 
corresponding probabilities of the 8 sequences are as follows:  
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The desired outcome, getting a car after two switches of doors, is achieved in sequences (1) 
(3), (4), and (7). The probability of getting a car after two switches of doors is therefore the 
sum of the 4 probabilities (1), (3), (4), and (7).  
 The common denominator of this probability is as follows.  
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And considering that 2 is the same as s and 1 therefore the same as s 1, this expression can 
be rewritten as follows.  
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By extending both (b) and (c), one can derive the following expression applying to any 
number of switches (s).  
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Expression (d) can be abbreviated as (e), without too great loss of transparency, and it has 
been so abbreviated in expression (a) anticipated above.  
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 The numerator of the probability at hand is the following sum of 4 terms found in 
sequences (1), (3), (4), and (7) above.  
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This sum can be rewritten as follows. 
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And therefore also in successive steps as follows.  
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And considering that 2 is the same as s and 1 therefore the same as s 1, expression (f) can be 
rewritten as follows. 
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By extending (f) and (g), one can derive the following expression of the numerator applying to 
any number of switches (s).  
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Expression (g) can be abbreviated as (h), without too great loss of transparency, and it has 
been so abbreviated in expression (a) anticipated above. 
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 In the specific case of the above example featuring 1 car, 6 doors, and 2 switches of doors, 
the general expression assumes the following form.  
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Entering the relevant integers, one obtains the probability already given above.  
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The chances of getting a car at the first door pick is c/d. The factor by which one increases 
one’s chances of getting a car after s switches is therefore as follows.  
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The factor by which one increases one’s chances of getting a car from 1 switch to s switches is 
therefore as follows.  
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And so on.  
 Finally, in Monty Hall 3.0, there were 2 coefficients for each term because there were 2 
events of picking doors, picking before switching and picking after switching. If doors are 
switched more than once, there will be more than 2 coefficients. I refrain from entering into 
detail at this time.  
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9. Empirical Definition of Mathematics, in Boole’s Footsteps, as a Cognitive Event on the 
Deepest Level  
 
9.1. Where Is Mathematics?  
 
The question that is at the center of the present section is as follows: What is mathematics? 
The answer to this question is of considerable interest. No endeavor of the human intellect has 
been more successful. Evidently, the question has occupied many, many minds over the 
centuries. The literature on the subject is massive. But even the most cursory review of what 
has been done readily reveals that the question can hardly be considered answered. There has 
been no lack of attempts to provide an answer. However, the proposed answers seem often 
irreconcilable and can even be diametrically opposed.  
 In order to define mathematics, one needs to be able to observe it. A second question 
therefore presents itself, as follows: Where is mathematics? In other words, where can one 
find mathematics so that one can take a look it and analyze it in order to determine what it 
really is?  
 It appears that the answer to the seemingly simple question as to where mathematics is has 
perhaps been the greatest point of controversy in the discussion of what mathematics is. There 
have been basically two diametrically opposed answers to the question where mathematics is. 
Some believe that mathematics is something inside the head. Others believe that it is 
something outside the head. Whereas many believe with Kurt G ‘ del that numbers exist 
independently of the human mind, many others like L.E.J. Brouwer are convinced that 
numbers are a creation of the human mind. Could both be right at the same time?  
 The position that I will adhere to is that mathematics can only be empirically observed as 
something that is inside the head. This position in no way involves a denial of the notion that 
8. Back to Boole. By Richard D. Gill
Summary
I comment on Leo Depuydt’s recent work on applying Boole’s work in probability theory to
the Monty Hall problem. In particular, I compare Boole’s notation and conventional mod-
ern probability notation, discuss modern computational tools, and make some comments
on Boole’s position that probability theory belongs to the laws of thought.
8.1 Introduction
George Boole’s work on probability theory stands on an equal intellectual level to his work
on logic, and was intended by him to be seen as an integral part thereof, yet it has largely
been forgotten. Now that three half centuries have gone by and probability theory has
flourished, following di↵erent routes, his work is harder than ever to read. It is impressive
that Leo Depuydt has been able to find his way into Boole’s way of thinking.
In this paper and its predecessor Leo tackles a number of variants of the Monty Hall
problem, showing how Boole’s approach leads to solutions despite ever increasing com-
plexity. From the point of view of a present day professional mathematician, my first
questions were: are the answers correct? Is Boole’s probability di↵erent from present day
probability?
The answers so far are yes: the answers are correct, and no, Boole (and with him
Depuydt) is using the same probability rules as present day probabilists. I emphasize so
far because Boole also claimed to be able to solve probability problems which modern
day probabilists consider insoluble, or perhaps one could better say, ill posed. Because
of this claim, influential writers of the early twentieth century such as Keynes dismissed
Boole’s work completely, and that hastened its progress into limbo. As Miller (2009) points
out [9], however, Boole’s solution was meaningful and complete, and based on adding
an assumption that in absence of further information, and in particular, with no logical
dependencies, an appropriate higher level of conditional statistical independence should be
assumed. In modern day terms, Boole fitted judiciously chosen log linear models to the
data, judiciously dropping higher order interactions about which there was no information
anyway. This connects to modern developments in graphical models (also known as Bayes
nets), another development which Boole would have appreciated, in which probability
models are represented by graphs and the same graphs used as foundation for graph-
theoretic based computations.
However, I do not know if Depuydt is also going to “authorize” this particular, more
controversial part, of Boole’s thinking.
Boole indeed saw probability theory as part of the laws of thought. His probabilities
are subjective degrees of belief, their numerical values follow logically from consideration
of information (known and unknown). He stood here full square in the nineteenth century
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tradition of Laplace, deriving probabilities from the principle of indi↵erence, but using
indi↵erence not just to specify probabilities but also to specify probability structures.
However, so far, we are considering here problems where all probabilities are completely
specified and where a frequentist (objectivist) and a Bayesian (subjectivist) approach will
give the same probability values, since in either approach the symmetries of the problem
force unique values of probabilities from “equally likely, by symmetry” arguments.
8.2 Notation
It is easiest to explain the di↵erence between Boole’s notation and modern day notation
by means of a simple (mathematical) example. Consider four events which can occur, or
not occur, in sequence. For instance, the results of a first pick of a door, a second pick,
and so on. Let me denote the events as A, B, C, D (capital letters early in the alphabet,
according to present day conventions). The modern view of probability theory is that we
may consider these events equally well as subsets of a set ⌦ of “elementary outcomes”.
The event A is identified with the set of all elementary outcomes ! 2 ⌦ for which A does
indeed happen. Probabilities are assigned to subsets of ⌦, and set theoretic operations
turn out to correspond to logical constructions involving events. For example, the event
that both A and B occur corresponds to the outcome of the probability experiment, ! 2 ⌦,
being both a member of the subset A and the subset B. Thus the probability of A and
B happening is identified with P (A \ B), where P (·) is a mapping from subsets of ⌦ to
numbers between zero and one.
SubsetsA, B, etc., are often called “compound events”. Provided however we are careful
with language, the words “elementary” and “compound” in the two contexts “elementary
outcomes ! 2 ⌦” and“compound events A ✓ ⌦”, are superfluous. But it also does no
harm to add them. The elementary outcomes correspond to the most fine-grained, most
detailed, description of what actually happened. Compound events correspond to coarse-
grained descriptions, by which many alternative “microscopic” ways according to which
the same “macroscopic” phenomenon can come about are all grouped together.
Whatever probabilities are supposed to mean (whether relative frequencies in the long
run of many repetitions, or whether degrees of belief as measured by fair betting odds),
everyone agrees that if two events can never happen together, the probability that either
occurs is equal to the sum of their probabilities; that certainty corresponds with probability
one; and that all probabilities are greater than or equal to zero. Converting these minimal
properties into the language of set theory, we obtain the now familiar axioms: P (⌦) = 1,
P (A)   0 for all A ✓ ⌦, A \ B = ; implies P (A [ B) = P (A) + P (B). Finally we
add as a definition of the conditional probability of A given B, as long as P (B) > 0:
P (A|B) = P (A \B)/P (B).
From these minimal properties one can derive the following chain rule:
P (A and B and C and D) = P (A)P (B|A)P (C|A and B)P (D|A and B and C). (1)
However, the alert reader will have noticed that I am mixing the language of logic and the
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language of elementary set theory in this equation, and I do that deliberately, in order to
point out an important ambiguity in the translation from logic to set theory.
The interpretation of the left hand side is obvious: I could have written (should have
written!), of course, P (A\B\C\D). The right hand side certainly makes sense, and indeed
the statement is true, if I do the corresponding substitutions on that side; for instance,
the last term should be P (D|A \ B \ C). However there is an alternative substitution,
more clumsily expressed in set theoretic language, but equally meaningful from the point
of view of natural language. The correctness of this alternative interpretation is actually
a theorem.
Let me explain. Suppose I start with a probability measure P . Next I pick some event
B with positive probability, and compute new probabilities PB(A) = P (A|B) for every
event A.
Theorem 1: the conditional probability measure PA also satisfies the axioms of probability
theory;
Theorem 2: (principle of repeated conditioning): (PA)B = PA\B.
This is not just empty formalism, it tells us something very important: conditioning in
turn on any number of events gives end results which do not depend on the order in which
we take them, and is also not changed by grouping them into a smaller number of events
by using the rule P (A|B and C) = P (A|B \ C). It shows us that the transition between
the language of logic and the language of sets is very smooth indeed.
Boole has no use for the language of sets. It was not even yet invented: his supporter
and contemporary John Venn was one of those who pioneered its use; indeed, its use in
probability theory. For Boole, the language of logic does fine both for events and for
probabilities of events. Defining the event E as “A and B and C and D”, Boole writes the
definition of the event E as
e = abcd (logical relation), (2)
and then rewrites equation (1), a relation between probabilities and conditional probabili-
ties, with the very same sequence of symbols:
e = abcd (numerical relation between probabilities). (3)
Even though equation (3) is to be interpreted numerically as a relation between prob-
abilities, the rules of algebra have to be handled with very great care. The exact sequence
of probabilities abcd corresponds to a specified sequence of events A, B, C, D and there is
a logic to this sequence: typically this will be their temporal ordering. The value assigned
to the numerical variable c, for instance, depends on the context, on the presence in front
of events a and b. Event D might be certain in some context, impossible in other. The
preceding events A, B and C could switch the probability d to 1, or to 0. This is what
Depuydt calls the digital nature of probabilities.
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8.3 Computations
One of the fruits of the digital revolution has been statistical computing and computer
algebra. Looking at the huge tables of probabilities in Sections 4.1 and 4.17, the reader
may worry that perhaps some typesetting error has corrupted one of the formulae. If the
reader actually wanted to use those formulae to do numerical computations, he or she
might want a computer do those computations. But then the typeset symbols have to be
translated into lines of computer code, which is another opportunity for errors to creep in.
I have verified that it is in principle possible to reproduce these tables using computer
algebra. Let the computer do the painstaking, repetitive task of applying simple rules
of transformations of formulas! Let the computer typeset the pages in the journal, let
the computer also generate computer code for implementation to specific cases! Then
the reader need only check the programs or scripts: do they implement Boole’s logic of
probability? There are two levels involved here. The problem should be described in a
high level formal language which translates line by line Depuydt’s verbal descriptions of
what he is doing into a language which the computer algebra system knows. Anyone who
understands the language can verify that it is “the same thing”. The implementation of
the computer algebra system must be checked by specialists, though users who use it day
by day for a myriad of tasks also provide external consistency checks whenever the answer
can be got by di↵erent means.
I would like especially to draw the reader’s attention to two powerful tools, both of
them completely free (both in the sense of “free beer” and in the sense of “free speech”):
the statistical language R (http://R-project.org) and the computer algebra system Sage
(http://sagemath.org). The freedom as in free speech is the fact that the computer code
of both R and Sage itself are publicly available, and anyone is allowed not only to look
at it but also to modify it, repackage it, and even to sell it, as long as their modifications
preserve the same freedoms.
Sage allows one to to instruct the computer to perform algebraic formula manipulations
according to specified rules. Boole would have appreciated that. Unlike commercial tools
like Mathematica, the algorithms which it uses are public; the scientist can check them,
even replace them by new algorithms of their own.
R is a statistical computing tool. One thing which is extremely easy with R is to
run a computer simulation of millions of repetitions of a particular generalized Monty
Hall problem, count outcomes of di↵erent kinds, in order to statistically estimate the
probabilities which can in principle be computed algebraically.
Both these systems are widely used in academia, in teaching, in industry; they have
huge followings and because of their open nature, additions have been written by users from
all kinds of application fields which anyone else can also freely use. The user communities
with their internet fora and mailing lists and so on, allows both the new user and the expert
to get advice from fellow users all over the world, often extremely rapidly and e↵ectively. R
can even be used from Sage – one of the design philosophies of Sage is to use existing tools,
so as not to waste time re-engineering wheels. This has certainly paid o↵, since in a short
time Sage has become extremely powerful and flexible. Like natural languages, culture, and
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like mathematics itself, these systems evolve through highly e↵ective “crowd-sourcing”.
8.4 Alternative approach
Depuydt goes back to first principles and determines the probabilities of all possible el-
ementary outcomes of his Monty Hall games: any particular sequence of picks of doors.
Now, it is possible to group some of the picks together, producing a coarser level of de-
scription, but one in which (a) the components of the coarser description correspond to
familiar probability models, and (b) the coarser description is fine enough to still allow
specification of the compound events of interest.
In Monty Hall 3.0, such a coarser description is possible at the level of phases. Recall
that in this game, c doors hide cars, g doors hide goats, d = c + g is the total number of
doors. The player first picks p doors. The host then opens q doors, revealing goats. The
player may now switch to another r doors.
The hosts’ possibilities are delimited by how many cars are hidden by the player’s first
p picks. Call this number x. We can now write down the joint probability of x cars being
behind the player’s first p picks, and y cars being behind the player’s second r picks, as
follows. Both phases correspond to a traditional “sampling without replacement” situation,
picking balls from vases, where the composition of the vase at phase two is determined by
the outcome of ball-picking in phase one.
Suppose a vase contains R red balls and B blue balls, let N = R+B be the total number
of balls in the vase. Suppose n balls are picked at random from vase, without replacement,
and completely at random. Define the binomial coe cient Cnx = n!/x!(n x)!, the number
of ways to choose x objects from a collection of n. In spoken mathematics, one says “n
choose x” instead of “C superscript n subscript x”. Let r be the number of red balls
in the sample of n, and define b = n   r to be the number of blue balls. It turns out
that the probability to find exactly r red balls is h(r;n,R,N) = CRr C
B
b /C
N
n . The fact
that these so-called hypergeometric probabilities must add up to one as one adds over
all possible values of r is called the Chu-Vandermonde identity in combinatorics, going
back to Chu Shi-Chieh, 1303, and Alexandre-The´ophile Vandermonde, 1772. One can say
that Depuydt has derived a “two-level” generalization of this identity from first principles,
following Boole’s methodology.
Now if among the first p doors chosen by the player exactly x doors hide cars, then at the
second stage, when there are d p q doors left from which the player may choose r doors,
a further q doors already having been opened revealing goats, exactly c  x of those doors
hide cars, and g  (p x) q hide goats. This tells us that the probability that the player’s
first p picks hide x cars and his second r picks hide y cars is h(x; p, c, d)h(y; r, c x, d p q).
This gives an alternative way to check the results of this paper.
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The factor by which one increases one’s chances of getting a car from 1 switch to s switches is 
therefore as follows.  
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And so on.  
 Finally, in Monty Hall 3.0, there were 2 coefficients for each term because there were 2 
events of picking doors, picking before switching and picking after switching. If doors are 
switched more than once, there will be more than 2 coefficients. I refrain from entering into 
detail at this time.  
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centuries. The literature on the subject is massive. But even the most cursory review of what 
has been done readily reveals that the question can hardly be considered answered. There has 
been no lack of attempts to provide an answer. However, the proposed answers seem often 
irreconcilable and can even be diametrically opposed.  
 In order to define mathematics, one needs to be able to observe it. A second question 
therefore presents itself, as follows: Where is mathematics? In other words, where can one 
find mathematics so that one can take a look it and analyze it in order to determine what it 
really is?  
 It appears that the answer to the seemingly simple question as to where mathematics is has 
perhaps been the greatest point of controversy in the discussion of what mathematics is. There 
have been basically two diametrically opposed answers to the question where mathematics is. 
Some believe that mathematics is something inside the head. Others believe that it is 
something outside the head. Whereas many believe with Kurt G ‘ del that numbers exist 
independently of the human mind, many others like L.E.J. Brouwer are convinced that 
numbers are a creation of the human mind. Could both be right at the same time?  
 The position that I will adhere to is that mathematics can only be empirically observed as 
something that is inside the head. This position in no way involves a denial of the notion that 
mathematics is something outside the head. Clearly, when applied to reality outside the head, 
mathematics works. Some may interpret this as proof that mathematics is also something 
outside the head. Then again, the totality of human experience of reality outside the head is 
how the brain perceives and processes this reality through the senses inside the head. This 
perception is itself 100% brain activity. Therefore, the analysis of the human experience ought 
to consist in the final resort, on the deepest level, of the analysis of brain activity. And one 
component of the brain activity that constitutes the human experience is mathematics. In that 
regard, the question as to whether mathematics is also something outside the brain is to some 
extent moot because mathematics cannot be empirically observed in that capacity anyhow, so 
there is hardly anything to be said about that capacity.  
 To some extent, G ‘ del’s position and Brouwer’s position are not in opposition. There is 
nothing that contradicts the notion that numbers are something that is both something outside 
the head and something inside the head. Naturally, numbers would inhabit different mediums 
inside the head and outside the head, physical reality and brain mass respectively. But when it 
comes to empirical observation, numbers can only be observed and therefore also analyzed as 
an activity of the brain or an event happening to the brain. Mathematics is something that the 
brain does.  
 The design of what follows is to resume a line of inquiry that has been abandoned about a 
century and a half ago. It appears that this line of inquiry is based on the assumption that 
mathematics is something the brain does.    
 
9.2. Resuming an Abandoned Line of Inquiry  
 
The aim of what follows is to pursue a line of inquiry that was initiated about a century and a 
half ago but fairly soon completely abandoned and ever since entirely disregarded. This line of 
inquiry is, I believe, worthy of being resumed. It appears to me that it can lead to a final 
definition of mathematics and its foundations. The initiator of the line of inquiry in question 
was George Boole, first in his The Mathematical Analysis of Logic (1847) [9], but then above 
all in his An Investigation of the Laws of Thought (1854), which may be regarded as the 
Magna Charta of the digital age [10]. The principal follower of Boole was John Venn in his 
Symbolic Logic (second edition, 1894) [11]. Whitehead notes that Venn gave “thorough 
consistency to Boole’s ideas and notation, with the slightest possible change” [12] and, more 
recently, Styazkhin observed that Venn “revealed the essence of the secret of success of 
Boole’s procedures” [13].  
 The Digital Age owes an extraordinary debt to Boole and to the digital mathematics that 
he created. Digital mathematics is a type of mathematics that is distinct from the more familiar 
type of mathematics, quantitative mathematics (to which Boole also made significant 
contributions, for example by his work on differential Equations). But digital mathematics is 
in the end just as mathematical as quantitative mathematics. Clearly, a line of inquiry initiated 
by Boole has proved to be successful. Little did Boole know to which uses his digital 
mathematics would be put when he wrote in 1847, “It would be premature to speak of the 
value which this method may possess as an instrument of scientific investigation” [14].  
 
9.3. Probability Theory as an Ulterior Aim of Said Line of Inquiry  
 
It is not clear to which extent Boole, when initiating the line of inquiry that ultimately 
spawned the Digital Age, had something like computer science in mind as an ulterior aim. In 
fact, in his Laws of Thought, digital mathematics is clearly subordinated to an ulterior aim of 
an entirely different kind, namely making classical probability theory complete.  
 It is not entirely certain whether Boole had this relation of subordination to probability 
theory in mind as soon as he began working on digital mathematics. There is no mention of 
probability theory in his The Mathematical Analysis of Logic of 1847, in which he first 
established his digital mathematics. But in Laws of Thought, digital mathematics is clearly 
styled as serving the aims of probability theory, as appears from the second part of the book’s 
long title, (An Investigation of the Laws of Thought,) on Which Are Founded the Mathematical 
Theories of Logic and Probabilities.  
 A great irony relating to Boole’s legacy is that his work on probability theory has been, 
with one or two exceptions [15], completely disregarded, almost entirely bypassed by the 
field. In the planned article mentioned at the end of §1, I intend to confirm that Boole’s 
probability theory does what it claims to do, make classical probability theory complete, and 
how it does so.  
 
9.4. Rational Thought and Language as an Ulterior Aim of Said Line of Inquiry 
 
But there seems to be more to the ulterior aims of Boole’s digital mathematics than statements 
about probability theory. Boole’s Laws of Thought and many of his other works on logic and 
probability, both published and unpublished, are replete with references to the nature of 
human thought in as far as thought is rational. The question as to whether he aimed to 
determine what is going on in one’s head when one thinks rationally is investigated below.  
 In any event, like Boole’s ideas on probability theory, this component too of his line of 
inquiry appears to have fallen by the wayside. Whereas the forthcoming article mentioned at 
the end of §1 is an attempt to validate Boole’s line of inquiry in relation to probability theory, 
what follows is an attempt to resume and extend this same line of inquiry as it relates to the 
deepest foundations of rational human thought and mathematics.  
 
9.5. Is Boole’s Work on Logic and Probability Mathematical or Cognitive in Nature?  
 
9.5.1. Modern Perception of Boole’s Work on Logic as Strictly Mathematical 
When one reads Boole’s writings on logic and probability, the following question easily 
arises: Is Boole doing mathematics or is he trying to determine how people think rationally? In 
other words, is he describing the mathematical structure of reality or is he trying to tell us 
what is going on in people’s heads when they think rationally? Boole’s contributions, to the 
extent that they have proved lasting, are now universally perceived as belonging to the realm 
of mathematics. Boolean algebra is after all ubiquitous. Bertrand Russell even accused Boole 
of giving his 1854 book the wrong title. He believed that Boole was “mistaken in supposing 
that he was dealing with the laws of thought,” because “the question how people actually think 
was quite irrelevant to him” [16]. Taking into consideration how people think while practicing 
mathematics is sometimes called psychologism, which some seem to regard as a bad word.  
 
9.5.2. Statements to the Contrary in Boole’s Writings 
There are abundant indications in Boole’s work that leave no doubt that how people think, at 
least as far as rational thought and language is concerned, was very much on his mind. In the 
Preface to the earlier Mathematical Analysis of Logic (1847), he states that he is not concerned 
with “quantity,” but with “facts of another order which have their abode in the constitution of 
the Mind” [17]. In the first statement following the Preface to the later Laws of Thought 
(1854), he announces [18]:  
 
The design of the following treatise is to investigate the fundamental laws of those operations of 
the mind by which reasoning is performed.  
 
How can such statements, when taken at face value, not pertain to what is going on inside the 
heads of people—notwithstanding attempts to soften their impact, perhaps to protect Boole 
from the charge of psychologism? [19]  
 Two possible reasons for resisting the notion that Boole could have been aiming to 
establish how the brain works are as follows.  
 First, mixing Boole’s mathematical results with reflections on the nature of thought might 
be seen as affecting the purity and objectivity of the former.  
 Second, at the present time, it remains still basically unknown—let alone that it was in 
Boole’s time—how the brain produces rational thought and language in biochemical terms, 
that is, which activities of neurons and synapses are responsible. So how could anyone have 
anything to say about how the biological brain reasons?  
 The first objection is addressed below. In regard to the second objection, I have noted 
elsewhere that, as one brain communicates with another through thought and language, all 
communications need to travel by air from the mouth of a speaker to the ear of a hearer or by 
light from the written page to a reader’s eyes. There can be no doubt that everything that is 
essential to the structure of rational thought and language must be conveyed in sound waves or 
light beams that travel from mouth to ear or from page to eye. In that sense, the structure of 
rational thought and language is empirically accessible. The same structure ought to be present 
inside the brain, even if inhabiting a different medium.  
 
9.5.3. Boole’s Own Perception of His Work on Logic as Mathematical 
While there can be no doubt that how the brain thinks is somehow a prominent concern in 
Boole’s writings, there are also plenty of statements in his writings that leave no doubt that he 
is firmly convinced that what he is doing when he is studying logic and probability is 
mathematics. He states, for example, that “the ultimate laws of Logic are mathematical in their 
form” [20].  
 As one tries to assess what exactly it is that Boole is trying to do, the impression gradually 
imposes itself and becomes inescapable that he is writing both about how the mind thinks and 
about mathematics. There are just too many categorical statements in his work that positively 
point to both. At this juncture, there is the possibility of assuming that there is something 
deeply confusing and contradictory in Boole’s work. One might seek to resolve the possible 
contradiction by discarding either the cognitive facet or the mathematical facet of Boole’s 
work as invalid. In choosing to reject either of the two, the easier choice would seem to be the 
cognitive facet. The mathematical facet has more than proved itself by applications in modern 
computer science.  
 Then again, it is difficult to overlook the many passages that concern how the mind thinks. 
Consider his analysis of the syllogism, which does not supplant Aristotle’s analysis but rather 
completes it. It seems easy for all to agree that we must think according to the rules of the 
syllogism if we are to reason correctly. And more generally, it is easy to convince oneself that 
what Boole says about how the mind thinks rings true. There just seems to be more to Boole’s 
writings than just mathematics. 
 
9.5.4. Could Boole’s Work on Logic Be Both Mathematical and Cognitive?  
The question arises: Could Boole have been doing both at the same time, producing 
mathematics and describing mental faculties? The following statement by Boole clearly 
indicates that his approach is at the same time mathematical and cognitive. What he sets out to 
discover is the mathematical structure of rational cognition [21]:  
 
The laws we have to examine are the laws of one of the most important of our mental faculties. 
The mathematics we have to construct are the mathematics of the human intellect.  
 
The present discussion has reached a critical juncture. It needs to be decided whether the 
cognitive facet of Boole’s line of inquiry should be pursued or dropped altogether. The 
validity of Boole’s digital mathematics says something about the overall soundness of his 
thinking. It can serve as an argument in favor of resuming the cognitive facet of the same 
general line of inquiry.  
 In resuming the cognitive facet, the concept described by Boole as the “mathematics of the 
human intellect” cited above will serve as a point of departure. What can possibly be meant by 
this concept? It would seem that it places mathematics somehow inside the human intellect. 
The way in which the concept will be interpreted in what follows is that mathematics is in 
essence a property and an activity of the brain. Mathematics is best defined as something that 
the brain does. In a planned article, I hope to show that probability theory is a good illustration 
of this definition. It seems otherwise quite tempting to interpret mathematics as exactly the 
opposite, namely as a property of reality outside the brain. As it happens, that very notion will 
also be assigned a place in the definition of mathematics as something that the brain does. 
Meanwhile, the principal consideration that leads to the definition of mathematics as an 
activity of the brain is presented in the next section.  
 
9.6. Mathematics as an Activity of the Brain  
 
The brain is evidently the most complex structure in the universe. It consists of billions of 
neurons and trillions of synapses. Still, it seems just as evident that the brain is a biological 
mass that is limited in size. There is only so much of it and no more. The following working 
hypothesis therefore seems to impose itself. The time will come when it will be possible to 
record everything that the brain does as it happens, presumably with the aid of supercomputers 
or the like. The opposite of this hypothesis is that a certain part of the brain will be forever 
inaccessible. But what could such an inaccessible part consist of? If everything in the brain is 
atoms and molecules and the like, then no activity in the brain should in the end avoid 
detection, one would think.  
 Another basic assumption is that the totality of human existence as we know it consists of 
how the brain perceives reality outside itself through the senses. There are many more senses 
than the classic five, including sensing the effects of the instincts with which the brain comes 
equipped at birth. In addition, perceptions received through the senses can be recombined in 
certain ways inside the brain. Dreams are one type of recombination. The opposite of this 
assumption is that there is something more to reality than what is perceived through the 
senses. It is difficult to see what that something more could be. Religion makes certain 
assumptions about that something more. But then, it is impossible to make everyone agree on 
what that something more is and the assumptions of religion are beyond scientific verification 
anyhow.  
 Once it is possible to record everything the brain does in its entirety, part of what is 
recorded will be the brain’s knowledge and practice of mathematics. It should be possible to 
observe exactly what the brain does when it engages in mathematics and how it starts up 
mathematical knowledge. The key question arises: Is there more to mathematics than recorded 
brain activity?  
 
9.7. The Brain as the Final Frontier: Towards a New Empiricism  
 
If the totality of the human experience consists of how the brain engages what is outside itself, 
then nothing that does not have some kind of imprint in the brain can mean anything to the 
brain. In assessing what is outside itself, the brain only has itself, as it were, to sort things out. 
And by itself is meant a complex and very large but ultimately limited and fully definable 
amount of activity of neurons and synapses and the like.  
 At first sight, it would seem as if mathematics is a property of reality in which the brain 
occasionally participates. Mathematics seems like a sacred code inscribed in the book of 
nature. But all that the brain can ultimately know about this code is the details of its own 
participation. And the details of this participation consist one hundred percent of brain 
activity. Therefore, if one truly wants to understand what mathematics is, then all one has as 
an object of study is the participation itself as brain activity. It is understandable that there 
may be a desire for more than just that. But the brain can hardly step outside itself, as it were. 
It is fully limited to its own activity and powers, and to the study of this activity and these 
powers in a search for understanding. The brain activity does not only include mathematical 
knowledge and reasoning, but also the act of perception in the form of signals reaching the 
brain from outside through the senses. Needless to say, once it is possible to observe all this 
brain activity, it will also be possible for this very act of observing brain activity to be itself 
observed, including by the person whose brain activity is being observed. It is a bit like a 
snake biting its own tail.  
 But what about the ever attractive notion that mathematics is a property of nature outside 
the brain? Nothing is more tempting than to subscribe to this assumption. In fact, I believe that 
there is nothing wrong with assuming that reality exhibits a structure that may be called 
mathematical and that this structure is somehow the origin of a certain type of brain activity 
that may be described as knowing and doing mathematics. It is an impossible to avoid 
assumption under which everyone effectively operates. One way of looking at the matter is as 
follows. It is not because there is no final verification of this assumption that the assumption 
should be rejected. The assumption receives abundant support from the fact that mathematics 
works. When mathematical knowledge is acquired and this knowledge is then returned to 
reality outside the brain by being applied correctly, as in building a bridge, the application will 
typically work, that is, the bridge will not collapse. But ultimately, mathematics can only be 
observed to the extent that it can be seen at work in the brain. Reality is experienced entirely 
in terms of how the brain engages what is outside itself through the senses. The scientific 
observation and analysis of this experience therefore ultimately needs to be the observation of 
the brain. And that also applies to mathematics as one type of reality. Anything else is beyond 
human knowledge. It is not possible to look behind the curtain, as it were, to establish why the 
brain is the way it is. Along these lines, Boole’s writes in somewhat Latinate English, “It may, 
perhaps, be permitted to the mind to attain a knowledge of the laws to which it is itself subject, 
without its being also given to it to understand their ground and origin, or even, except in a 
very limited degree, to comprehend their fitness for their end, as compared with other and 
conceivable systems of law” [22].  
 Because the assumption that the structure of reality outside the brain is mathematical is 
just an assumption, it is not possible to probe the deeper roots of this presumed structure. 
There is of course nothing that prevents anyone from engaging in speculation to any degree. It 
is likewise possible to speculate without restrictions about other possible types of realities in 
which other possible types of mathematics apply. 
 Knowledge is ultimately a process of assimilation in which the brain assimilates to reality 
outside itself. For example, to find one’s way through the streets of a city without consulting a 
street map, the brain needs to acquire something of the structure of the layout of the city’s 
streets and in that sense become a little like that layout. But it is reasonable to assume that, in 
the process of assimilation, there needs to be something to assimilate to. Therefore, if part of 
the assimilation is mathematical, there is presumably something mathematical in reality 
outside the brain to which the brain assimilates. 
 The fact that the knowledge of mathematics is stored in the books of a mathematics library 
may also seem to suggest that mathematics is something outside the head and hence first and 
foremost a property of nature, with its reflection inside the head being somehow secondary. 
However, the books in question are nothing more than paper and ink until an active brain 
reads and studies them. In that sense, a tree does not fall in the forest if there is no one there to 
hear it. The mathematics in a book is not mathematics if it is not actively engaged by a 
thinking brain. 
 
9.8. Conclusion  
 
It is possible to reconcile as complimentary the view adhered to by someone like Brouwer that 
mathematics is something inside the head and the view adhered to by someone like Gödel that 
mathematics is something outside the head. In other words, the two views do not contradict 
one another. However, that mathematics is something outside the head is only an assumption. 
But it is an assumption that is hard to deny. So to some degree Gödel’s view can be 
recognized. Still, it is only as something inside the head that mathematics can be truly 
observed and therefore become the subject of empirical inquiry once the secrets of the brain 
are unlocked. In that regard, the cognitive approach is the only one that offers a systematic 
path of scientific investigation. I hope to apply the cognitive approach in planned papers, 
beginning with the branch of mathematics called probability theory. It will be useful to 
formulate the foundations of probability theory fully in cognitive fashion.  
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